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ABSTRACT
The requirement of harm has significantly impeded the enforcement of privacy
law. In most tort and contract cases, plaintiffs must establish that they have
suffered harm. Even when legislation does not require it, courts have taken it
upon themselves to add a harm element. Harm is also a requirement to establish
standing in federal court. In Spokeo v. Robins and TransUnion v. Ramirez, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts can override congressional judgment
about cognizable harm and dismiss privacy claims.
Caselaw is an inconsistent, incoherent jumble, with no guiding principles.
Countless privacy violations are not remedied or addressed on the grounds that
there has been no cognizable harm.
Courts struggle with privacy harms because they often involve future uses of
personal data that vary widely. When privacy violations result in negative
consequences, the effects are often small – frustration, aggravation, anxiety,
inconvenience – and dispersed among a large number of people. When these
minor harms are suffered at a vast scale, they produce significant harm to
individuals, groups, and society. But these harms do not fit well with existing
cramped judicial understandings of harm.
This article makes two central contributions. The first is the construction of a
typology for courts to understand harm so that privacy violations can be tackled
and remedied in a meaningful way. Privacy harms consist of various different
types, which to date have been recognized by courts in inconsistent ways. Our
typology of privacy harms elucidates why certain types of privacy harms should
be recognized as cognizable.
The second contribution is providing an approach to when privacy harm should
be required. In many cases, harm should not be required because it is irrelevant
to the purpose of the lawsuit. Currently, much privacy litigation suffers from a
misalignment of enforcement goals and remedies. We contend that the law
should be guided by the essential question: When and how should privacy
regulation be enforced? We offer an approach that aligns enforcement goals
with appropriate remedies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Harm has become one of the biggest challenges in privacy law.1 Law’s treatment
of privacy harms is a jumbled, incoherent mess. Countless privacy violations are
left unremedied not because they are unworthy of being addressed but because
of the failure to recognize harm. As Ryan Calo has observed, “courts and some
scholars require a showing of harm in privacy out of proportion with other areas
of law.”2
Privacy law in the United States is a sprawling patchwork of various types of
law, from contract and tort to statutes and other bodies of law.3 As these laws
are enforced, especially in the courts, harm requirements stand as a major
impediment. When cases are dismissed due to the lack of harm, wrongdoers
escape accountability. The message is troubling—privacy commitments
enshrined in legislation and common law can be ignored.
In several ways, harm emerges as a gatekeeper in privacy cases. Harm is an
element of many causes of action. Courts, however, refuse to recognize privacy
harms that do not involve tangible financial or physical injury.4 But privacy
harms more often involve intangible injuries, which courts address
inconsistently and with considerable disarray. Many privacy violations involve
broken promises or thwarted expectations about how people’s data will be
collected, used, and disclosed. The downstream consequences of these practices
are often hard to determine in the here and now. Other privacy violations involve
flooding people with unwanted advertising or email spam. Or, people’s
expectations may be betrayed, resulting in their data being shared with third
parties that may use it in detrimental ways –but precisely when and how is
unknown.
For many privacy harms, the injury may appear small when viewed in isolation,
such as the inconvenience of receiving an unwanted email or advertisement or
the failure to honor people’s expectation that their data will not be shared with
third parties. But when done by hundreds or thousands of companies, the harm
adds up. Moreover, these small harms are dispersed among millions (and
1

Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 508 (2010)
(“Delineating remediable harms has been a challenge for law and policy makers since the early
days of the Internet.”).
2
Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 Colo. Tech. L.J. 361, 361 (2014); see also Ryan
Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 33, 48 (2019) (Courts “do not
understand privacy loss as a cognizable injury, even as they recognize ephemeral harms in other
contexts”).
3
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (7th ed. 2021).
4
Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 747, 798-99 (2016) (“For most courts, privacy and data security harms are too
speculative and hypothetical, too based on subjective fears and anxieties, and not concrete and
significant enough to warrant recognition.”).
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sometimes billions) of people. Over time, as people are each inundated by a
swarm of small harms, the overall societal impact is significant. Yet, these types
of injuries do not fit well into judicial conceptions of harm, which have an
individualistic focus and heavily favor tangible physical and financial injuries
that occur immediately.
Some statutory laws recognize government agency or state attorney general
enforcement that are less constrained by judicial conceptions of harm, but these
enforcers have limited resources so can only bring a handful of actions each
year.5 To fill the anticipated enforcement gap, legislators have often included
statutory private rights of action. The financial rewards of litigating and winning
cases work like a bounty system, encouraging private parties to enforce the law.6
To address the difficulties in establishing privacy harms, several privacy statutes
contain statutory damages provisions, which allow people to recover a minimum
amount of money without having to prove harm.
Courts, however, have wrought havoc on legislative plans for statutory damages
in privacy cases by adding onerous harm requirements. In Doe v. Chao, for
example, the Supreme Court held that a statutory damages provision under the
federal Privacy Act of 1974 would only impose such damages if plaintiffs
established “actual” damages.7 As a second punch, the Supreme Court held in
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper that emotional distress alone was
insufficient to establish actual damages under the Privacy Act.8 In a variation of
this theme, in Senne v. Village of Palatine,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had to prove harm to recover under a private
right of action for a violation of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act even
though the provision lacked any harm requirement.
Courts have also injected harm as a gatekeeper to the enforcement of the law
through modern standing doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
plaintiffs cannot pursue cases in federal court unless they have suffered an
“injury in fact.”10 Specifically, in the privacy law context, in 2016, the Supreme
Court in Spokeo v. Robins, concluded in a case involving the Fair Credit
Reporting Act that courts could deny standing to plaintiffs seeking to recover
under private rights of action in statutes. The court stated that even if a
legislature granted plaintiffs a right to recover without proving harm, courts
5

Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 747, 799 (2016) (“Federal authorities cannot attend to most privacy and security
problems because their resources are limited and their duties ever expanding. Simply put, federal
agencies have too few resources and too many responsibilities.”).
6
See Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he award
of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system, and Congress is permitted
to create legally enforceable bounty systems for assistance in enforcing federal laws.”).
7
540 U.S. 614, 614 (2004). Id. at 614.
8
132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
9
695 F.3d.597 (7th Cir. 2015).
10
Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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could require a plaintiff to prove harm to establish standing.11
Due to judicial intervention, the requirement of privacy harm is inescapable.
Even when legislation does not require proof of harm, courts exert their will to
add it in, turning the enforcement of privacy law into a far more complicated
task than it should be. Privacy harm is a conceptual mess, which significantly
impedes U.S. privacy law from being effectively enforced. Even when
organizations have engaged in clear wrongdoing, privacy harm requirements
often result in cases being dismissed.
In this Article, we clear away the fog so that privacy harms can be better
understood and appropriately addressed.12 We set forth a typology that explains
why particular harms should be legally cognizable. We show how concepts and
doctrines in other areas of law can be applied in the context of privacy harms.
In addition to the issue of what should constitute cognizable privacy harm, we
also examine the issue of when privacy harm should be required. In many cases,
harm should not be required because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the lawsuit.
The overarching question that the law should ask is: When and how should
various privacy laws be enforced? This question brings into focus the underlying
source of the law’s current malaise—the misalignment of enforcement goals and
remedies. We propose an approach that aligns enforcement goals with
appropriate remedies.
Properly recognizing privacy harm is not just essential for litigation but also for
its expressive value as well as for legislation and regulatory enforcement.
Appropriately identifying the interests at stake is essential for the law to balance
them and protect them.
This Article has five parts. Part I discusses when the law requires cognizable
harm in order to enforce privacy regulation. Part II examines several challenges
that make it difficult to recognize certain types of privacy harms. Part III
examines when privacy harm should be required in privacy litigation and how
the law should better align enforcement goals and remedies. Part IV discusses
the importance of recognizing privacy harm. Part V sets forth a typology of
privacy harms, explaining why each involves an impairment of important
interests, how law tackles them, and why the law should do so.

11

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
Previously, we wrote an article about data breach harms. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 737 (2018). We
write separately on privacy harms because they are quite different. Data breach harms often
involve either anxiety or a risk of future identity theft or fraud. Privacy harms are more varied
than data breach harms and involve many other dimensions that pose challenges for the law.
12
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I. COGNIZABLE HARMS: THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF PRIVACY HARMS
Requirements to establish harm serve as a major hurdle in privacy cases. Harms
involve an injury, setback, loss, or impairment to well-being.13 They leave
people or society worse off than before their occurrence. Frequently,
establishing harm is a prerequisite to the enforcement for privacy violations in
the judicial system. A cognizable harm is harm that the law recognizes as
suitable for intervention.14
Through harm requirements, courts have made the enforcement of privacy laws
difficult, and, at times, impossible. They have added requirements for harm via
standing. They have required harm for statutes that do not require such a
showing. They have mandated proof of harm even for statutes that include
statutory damages, undercutting the purpose of these provisions. They have
adopted narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to exclude many types of harm,
including emotional injury and dashed expectations. Because courts lack a
theory of privacy harms or any guiding principles, they have made a mess of
things. This Part discusses the varied ways that harm is involved in privacy
cases.
A. STANDING
To pursue a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing. Standing is
based on Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which states that courts are limited
to hearing “cases” or “controversies.”15 In a series of cases starting in the second
half of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed harm at the
center of standing doctrine.16 State courts generally do not require proof of
standing.
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a rather tortured body of standing
doctrine, which is restrictive in its view of harm as well muddled and
contradictory. Under contemporary standing doctrine, plaintiffs must allege an
“injury in fact.”17 The injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”18 If a plaintiff lacks standing to
13

A taxonomy of privacy developed by one of us focused on privacy problems. DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). Problems are broader than harms. Problems are
undesirable states of affairs. Harms are a subset of problems.
14
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1984); see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (1881, reissued 1963); Thomas C. Grey,
Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1272 (2001) (discussing Holmes’s harm-based
approach).
15
U.S. Const. Art. I.
16
Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
17
Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
18
Id.
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bring a claim, a federal court cannot hear it. Three cases decided during the past
decade focused on privacy issues.
In 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International,19 a group of lawyers, journalists,
and activists challenged the constitutionality of surveillance by the National
Security Agency (NSA). The plaintiffs contended that because they were
communicating with foreign people whom the NSA was likely to deem
suspicious, they feared their communications would be wiretapped. The
plaintiffs took measures to avoid governmental surveillance that would pierce
attorney-client confidentiality, including spending time and money to travel in
person to talk to clients.20 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they failed to prove that they were actually under government
surveillance or that such surveillance was “certainly impending.” The plaintiffs’
“speculation” about being under surveillance was insufficient.21 In a footnote,
the Court noted that, “in some instances,” a “substantial risk that the harm will
occur would be sufficient to confer standing to plaintiff.”22 The Court never
explained what would constitute a “substantial risk.”
Although Clapper had a significant impact on data breach cases, a subsequent
case took center stage for standing in privacy cases. In 2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, the Supreme Court attempted to elaborate on the types of harm that
could be sufficient to establish standing.23 The Court focused on whether
statutory violations involving personal data constituted harm sufficient to
establish standing. The plaintiff alleged that Spokeo, a site supplying
information about people’s backgrounds, violated the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) when it published incorrect data about him.24 Spokeo’s
profiles were used by employers to investigate prospective hires, an activity
regulated by the FCRA. The FCRA mandates that firms take reasonable steps to
ensure the accuracy of data in people’s profiles.25 The plaintiff’s dossier was
riddled with falsehoods, including that he was wealthy, married, had children,
and worked in a professional field.26 According to the plaintiff, these errors hurt
19

133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
For a thoughtful analysis of Clapper, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126
Harv. L. Rev. 1934 (2013).
21
The Clapper case comes with a dose of cruel irony. Although the government diminished the
plaintiffs’ concerns about surveillance by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that they
were subject to it, the government knew the answer all along (it was surely engaging in such
surveillance), but because the program was classified as a state secret, the plaintiffs did not and
could not know for sure that they were being subject to surveillance. See Seth F. Kreimer,
“Spooky Action at a Distance:” Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U Pa. J.
Con. L. 745, 757 (2016).
22
Id. at 1150 n.5. In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court, quoting Clapper, held that
“an allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or
there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).
23
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
24
Id. at 1544.
25
15 U.S.C. § 1681.
26
Id. at 1546.
20
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his employment chances by indicating that he was overqualified for positions he
sought or that he might not be able to relocate because he had a family.27
Although the plaintiff properly sued under FCRA’s private right of action,
according to the district court, the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not
suffered an injury based on the erroneous information included in his credit
report.28 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds
that the statute resolved the question of whether a cognizable injury existed:
FCRA explicitly allowed plaintiffs to sue for any violation of FCRA.29
The U.S. Supreme Court took up the case, issuing an opinion purporting to
clarify standing doctrine, but instead creating significant confusion. Instead of
deferring to congressional judgment for when plaintiffs could sue for violations
of the FCRA, the Court added harm into the equation through standing.
Reversing and remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Court explained that
harm must be “concrete” and that “intangible harm” could be sufficient in some
cases to establish injury.30 According to the Court, a “real risk of harm” could
satisfy the concreteness inquiry because long-standing common law has
“permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult
to prove or measure.”31 The question would turn on “whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”32
Unfortunately, the common law invoked by the Court points in different
directions. The Court’s discussion of “intangible harm” ended up creating
confusion rather than clarity.
The Court confounded matters in yet another way—it instructed courts to assess
the judgment of Congress” to figure out “intangible harm constitutes injury in
fact.”33 The Court began by noting:
[W]e said in Lujan that Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.’ Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case
explained that ‘Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.’34

27

Id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.at 1546.
29
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
See FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (willful violations), and 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (negligent
violations).
30
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
31
Id. at 1549.
32
Id. at 1549.
33
Id. at 1549.
34
Id. at 1549 (citations omitted).
28
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Although Congress could independently define “concrete injury” in a way that
enlarged the concept, the Court also said that Congress could deviate only so
much:
Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean
that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize
that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For that reason,
Robins could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of
Article III.35
As to how far Congress could deviate from courts in defining injuries, the Court
failed to provide a clear answer. As an example, the Court noted that courts could
reject a “bare procedural violation” of a statute as an injury, but this example
was muddled with further explanation:
[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in
some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff
in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress
has identified.36
The Court thus said on one hand that a mere violation of a procedural
right can be sufficient for concrete injury “without any additional harm.” But,
on the other hand, a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm” cannot constitute concrete harm. So, how are courts to distinguish
between when a violation of a procedural right is a concrete injury and when it
is not?
The Court tried to explain its reasoning by noting that Congress passed the
FCRA “to curb the dissemination of false information,” so bare procedural
violations would not support standing if they did not operate to prevent such
inaccuracies.37 The Court explained that consumers may not be able to sue a
consumer reporting agency for failing to provide notice required by the statute
if the information in their dossiers was accurate.38 The Court further complicated
matters by stating that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material
risk of harm.” The example provided by the Court was an incorrect zip code.
The Court explained, “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”39

35

Id. at 1549
Id. at 1549
37
Id. at 1550.
38
Id. at 1550.
39
Id. at 1550.
36
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The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to “examine whether the
particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk
sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”40 The Court noted that it was
not taking a particular position about whether Robins properly alleged an injury.
In the wake of Spokeo, courts issued a contradictory mess of decisions regarding
privacy harm and standing. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins had
suffered harm, justifying standing.41 The court applied a test from the Second
Circuit that assessed whether a statutory provision was designed to protect
people’s concrete interests and whether those interests were at risk of harm in a
particular case.42 Other courts have extracted a two-prong test from the
wreckage, first looking to “historical inquiry” that “asks whether an intangible
harm ‘has a close relationship’ to one that historically has provided a basis for a
lawsuit,” and second, looking to a “congressional inquiry” that “acknowledges
that Congress’s judgment is ‘instructive and important’ because that body ‘is
well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements.’”43
In the lower courts, no clear principles emerged to guide the harm inquiry for
standing in privacy cases. Rather than a circuit split or other clear disagreement
in approach, courts produced a jumbled mess by grasping at inconsistent parts
of Spokeo.44 Predictably, courts reached opposing conclusions as to the very
same or similar FCRA violations. In Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co., the Ninth Circuit concluded that violating FCRA by failing to provide the
plaintiff with a copy of his credit report before disqualifying him from the hiring
process was not a harm because the correct information in the credit report
would have prevented him from getting a job anyway.45 By contrast, in Long v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Third Circuit denied
standing to a plaintiff suing under FCRA for not being provided with his
background check before being rejected for a job.46
As the Third Circuit stated in another case involving a FCRA violation: “In some
cases, we have appeared to reject the idea that the violation of a statute can, by
itself, cause an injury sufficient for purposes of Article III standing. But we have
also accepted the argument, in some circumstances, that the breach of a statute
is enough to cause a cognizable injury — even without economic or other

40

Id. at 1550.
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018).
42
Id. at 1113 (citing Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016).
43
Long v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Spokeo).
44
Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms, 118 Mich. L. Rev.
471, 483 (2019) (Spokeo has affected consumer protection laws unevenly. For example, while it
risks extinguishing claims arising under FACTA, claims under TCPA are virtually
unimpeded.”).
45
Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018).
46
Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2018).
41
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tangible harm.”47 As the Sixth Circuit declared when it dismissed a case for lack
of standing: “It’s difficult, we recognize, to identify the line between what
Congress may, and may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart
lawyers in a room, and it won’t take long to appreciate the difficulty of the task
at hand.”48
In its coup de grâce, the Supreme Court in 2021 revisited standing and FCRA in
TransUnion v. Ramire.49 TransUnion incorrectly labeled the plaintiffs as
potential terrorists in their credit reports. The Supreme Court held that only the
plaintiffs whose credit reports had been disclosed to businesses had standing;
plaintiffs whose credit reports had not yet been disseminated had not suffered a
concrete injury.50 As the Court pithily concluded, “No concrete harm, no
standing.”51
To determine whether harm is concrete, the Court elaborated: “Central to
assessing concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to
a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
courts.”52 However, the Court provided scant guidance about how close the
relationship must be to traditionally recognized harm. Another difficulty with
this test is that harm often has not been required at all, as Justice Thomas pointed
out in his dissent.53 Additionally, the harms that courts have recognized have
evolved considerably in the common law.54 Pointing to tradition is pointing to a
moving target.
In the end, applying this test is difficult because the tradition of the common law
is complicated, nuanced, and shifting. The Court in TransUnion appeared to
have a different conception of the tradition in mind, and other courts will likely
interpret the tradition in diverging ways. Ultimately, looking for a close
relationship to traditionally recognized harms leaves the door open for courts to
reach wildly different conclusions in cases. Standing doctrine in privacy
litigation will thus remain muddled and inconsistent.
B. HARM IN CAUSES OF ACTION
For plaintiffs in federal court, standing is just the first harm hurdle. The second
is showing harm as an element of claims alleged in the lawsuit. In state courts,
where there is no standing requirement, most causes of action have harm as one
47

In re Horizon Healthcare Data Breach, 846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir. 2017).
Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2018).
49
TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
50
Id. at 2200.
51
Id. For more background about TransUnion v. Ramirez and our extensive critique of the
decision, see Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Standing and Privacy Harms: A Critique
of TransUnion v. Ramirez, 101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 62 (2021).
52
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2197.
53
See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2217 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54
Solove & Citron, Standing and Privacy Harms, supra note X, at __.
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of the elements. Different types of causes of action recognize cognizable harm
differently.
1. Contract Law
Contract law might seem to be a relevant body of law to regulate many privacy
issues, as many privacy violations involve organizations breaking promises
made in privacy policies. These policies could be deemed to be contracts or at
the least subject to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But, on the main, courts
have been reluctant to recognize privacy policies as contracts.55
Even if privacy policies were contracts, the plaintiffs would still lose due to the
absence of cognizable harm.56 Under contract law, courts typically will not
recognize harm without proof of economic loss. Failing to fulfill promises made
in privacy policies and thus betraying people’s expectations has been
insufficient to constitute a cognizable harm.57 For example, in Smith v. Trusted
Universal Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., the court stated that plaintiff
must “plead loss flowing from the breach [of contract] to sustain a claim.”58 In
Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., the court held that “[m]ere disclosure” of personal
information “without a showing of actual harm” is “insufficient to support a
claim of breach of contract.”59 In In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, the court
rejected plaintiffs’ theory they suffered “appreciable and actual damage” in a
suit for breach of contract.”60
2. Tort Law
Most tort claims require that plaintiffs establish harm. As tort law developed in
55

Courts have decided surprisingly few cases involving contract law theories for privacy notices.
Of those cases, few have held that privacy policies amount to enforceable contracts. A group of
academics published an empirical analysis of cases and concluded that many courts were holding
that privacy notices were contracts. See Oren Bar-Gill et al., Searching for the Common Law:
The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7
(2017). These academics used their study as part of their project with the American Law
Institute, the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law. However, Gregory Klass critiqued the
study, finding that the case holdings were incorrectly evaluated, treating issues in dicta or not
addressed as definitive holdings. Klass found “little support” for any “trend towards contractual
enforcement of privacy notices.’” Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 45-115 (2019). A subsequent
analysis of the Bar-Gill study sided with Klass. Adam J. Levitin et. al., The Faulty Foundation
of the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 447 (2019).
56
See infra text accompanying notes.
57
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 881-84,
892-3 (2003).
58
Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL 1799456 (D.N.J.
May 4, 2010).
59
Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., 5:12-CV-01399 EJD, 2012 WL 5471149 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012),
appeal dismissed (Dec. 13, 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
60
In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, C 10-02389 JW, 2011 WL 6176208 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22,
2011).
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the nineteenth century, a lively debate centered on whether tort law concerned
the recognition of wrongs or, alternatively, the redress of harms. In The Common
Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that tort law provided remedies for
activities “not because they are wrong, but because they are harms.’61 Modern
tort law has embraced the Holmesian approach.62
The privacy torts grew out of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s influential
article in 1890, The Right to Privacy.63 For students of their famous article, that
result is odd given its rights-based focus on interferences with “individuals’
ability to develop their ‘inviolate’ personalities without unwanted
interference.”64 The judicial development of the privacy torts can be attributed
to William Prosser, the leading torts scholar of the 20th century, who played an
enormous role in mainstreaming and legitimizing the privacy torts.65
Prosser made the turn to harm explicitly and clearly, and courts followed suit.
In 1960, in an article entitled Privacy, Prosser summed up a scattered body of
caselaw to identify four torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. 66 As reporter on
the influential American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Prosser added the four categories of privacy torts to the Restatement.67 Prosser
followed the Holmesian harms-based approach in constructing the privacy
torts.68After Prosser’s article and the Restatement, courts readily embraced the
privacy torts.69 Although Prosser strengthened the privacy torts, his work
ossified them.70 No new privacy torts were created in the years following
Prosser’s shining the spotlight on them.
Today, nearly all states recognize most of the privacy torts.71 Courts rarely
question the existence of harm or the fact that the basis of harm for many privacy

61

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 144 (1881).
There is a robust and important literature on tort law as the recognition of wrongs. See JOHN
C.P GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020).
63
Samuel L. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
64
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805, 1820 (2010)
(quoting Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy).
65
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805 (2010); Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1887
(2010).
66
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
67
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L.
Rev. 1887 (2010).
68
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra, at 1821-24.
69
Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supre note X, at 1903.
70
Id. at 1904-07; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (1980).
71
Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supre note X, at 1904
62

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222

PRIVACY HARMS
torts is pure emotional distress. They tend to presume the existence of harm.72
And yet while the privacy torts handily address the privacy problems of Warren
and Brandeis’s time, such as invasions of privacy by the media, this is not the
case for modern privacy problems involving the collection, use, and disclosure
of personal data. Because courts cling rigidly to the elements of the privacy torts
as set forth in the Restatement, the privacy torts have little application to
contemporary privacy issues.73
Other mainstream torts have been invoked to address privacy issues, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of confidentiality, and
negligence. These torts are often limited by harm requirements, making it
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain redress. For example, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort requires proof of “severe emotional distress,” which can
be difficult to establish.74
3. Statutory Causes of Action
Many state and federal privacy statutes provide for private rights of action.
Typically, the assumption is that a private right of action is a legislative
recognition of harm, though there is no rule or doctrine that commands that all
private rights of action in statutes are adopted to redress harm. Some might be
there to facilitate private enforcement of a law or to deter violations.
Countless federal and state privacy laws have private rights of action. At the
federal level, notable laws with private rights of action include the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA), among others.75
72

Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note X, at 768-70.
Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note X, at 798 (“Overly narrow interpretations of the
privacy torts--intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and
misappropriation of image--have prevented their ability to redress data harms.”); Citron,
Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note X at __.
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (liability for “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another”). This tort was
of particular interest to Prosser, who wrote a key article about it in 1939. William Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 39 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). In the first
edition of his treatise on tort law, published in 1941, Prosser noted that “the law has been slow
to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even against
intentional invasions. It has not been until recent years that there has been any general admission
that the infliction of mental distress, standing alone, may serve as the basis for an action, apart
from any other tort.
75
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 47 U.S.C. § 277(c)(5);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 18 U.S.C. §2520 (Wiretap
Act), §2707 (Stored Communications Act); Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), Pub. L. No.
100-618, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 90-32, 15 U.S.C.
§1681n (willful violations) and §1681o (negligent violations), Cable Communications Policy
Act (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 98-549, 47 U.S.C. §,551(f). For a more complete list of federal laws
with private rights of action, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
73
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At the state level, the California Consumer Privacy Act has a private right of
action, but only for data security breaches.76 Several state unfair and deceptive
acts and practices laws (called “UDAP” laws) have private rights of action.77
The Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) also has a private right of action.78
Congress has recognized statutory damages for these private rights.79 Under the
FCRA (the federal law at issue in Spokeo),80 any person who willfully violates
“any requirement” in the statute is liable to in an amount equal to the sum of
damages sustained by the consumer or “damages of not less than $100 and not
more than $1,000.”81 There is no harm requirement in the Wiretap Act, the
Stored Communications Act, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Video
Privacy Protection Act, and the Cable Communications Policy Act.82
The Supreme Court has complicated recovery under these private rights of
action by forcing plaintiffs to prove harm even though the statutes provide for
statutory damages. For example, the Supreme Court has made recovery of
damages under the federal Privacy Act exceedingly difficult. In Doe v. Chao,83
the U.S. Department of Labor improperly disclosed the Social Security Numbers
of people filing for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A group of
plaintiffs sued under the Privacy Act. The lead plaintiff stated that he was “torn
. . . all to pieces” by the disclosure and was “greatly concerned and worried.”84
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statutory damages provision under the
Privacy Act was only available if plaintiffs established actual damages.85
In a subsequent case, Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper,86 the Supreme
FUNDAMENTALS 160-61 (2019).
76
California Consumer Privacy Act of 1018, AB 375.
77
Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, supra note, at 798. Many UDAP
laws require or have been interpreted to require a showing of injury. Almost half of state UDAP
laws restrict claims for intangible injuries. See Carolyn Carter, Consumer Protection in the
States: A 50-State Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices Law 2, 40 (2018)
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.
78
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1.
79
The meaning of a private right of action with statutory damages is debatable. Is a private right
of action a recognition of harm, with the statutory damages being imposed because harm can be
difficult for plaintiffs to establish? Or is the purpose of the statutory damages to enable recovery
in the absence of any harm because of other goals? Either way, the presence of statutory damages
means that courts do not have to hold bench or jury trials on the question of recovery—
lawmakers have supplied their judgment as to the appropriate extent of redress.
80
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
81
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
82
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709;
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721- 2725; Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710-2712; Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §§521-573
83
Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 614; see Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 Colo. Tech. L. J. 361 (2014)
(discussing the Court’s refusal to recognize emotional harm as a basis for statutory damages
under Privacy Act).
86
132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
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Court held that emotional distress alone could not amount to actual damages
under the Privacy Act. Three justices, writing in dissent, argued that Congress
passed the Privacy Act to protect against “substantial harm” that included
“embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual.”87 The result
of the Court’s holding was that a “federal agency could intentionally or willfully
forgo establishing safeguards to protect against embarrassment and no
successful private action could be taken against it for the harm Congress
identified.”88
The overall effect of Doe v. Chao and FAA v. Cooper has been to drastically
limit the enforcement of the Privacy Act through private rights of action.
Plaintiffs now have to prove willful conduct as well as establish harm, and they
are forbidden from using emotional distress to do so, which is a common type
of harm in privacy cases. Congress created the private right of action with
statutory damages as an enforcement mechanism in the law, but the Court
effectively cancelled it. The Privacy Act now has far too few enforcement
actions.
Even when federal statutes do not mention having to prove damages, some
courts have taken it upon themselves to add a requirement of harm. Consider
Senne v. Village of Palatine.89 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not pursue a private cause of action
for a violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) because plaintiff
could not demonstrate injury. The Village of Palatine had a practice of including
identifying information, such as people’s height and weight, on parking tickets
placed under their windshield wipers. Although the Village’s practice was a
clear DPPA violation, the court concluded that “we need to balance the utility
(present or prospective) of the personal information on a parking ticket against
the potential harm.”90 The court acknowledged that “the Act does not state that
a permissible use can be offset by the danger that the use will result in a crime
or tort,” yet created a harm requirement anyway.91 The court struck down the
right to sue under DPPA because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of harm,
such as “stalking or any other crime (such as identity theft),” “tort (such as
invasion of privacy),” disclosure over the Internet, or that “highly sensitive
information” like social security number was involved.92
Through interpretations like these, coupled with standing, courts are
undercutting the enforcement of privacy laws by creating harm requirements out
of whole cloth. Courts are generally supposed to be deferential to the legislative
policy goals, striking down laws only when they traduce a constitutional
87

Id. (Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Bryer, J., dissenting) (quoting 5. U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10)).
Id.
89
Senne v. Village of Palatine, 784 F.3d.444 (7th Cir. 2015).
90
Id. at 447.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 448.
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boundary or infringe upon a right. But courts are trading deference for activism,
undermining laws in an underhanded way. Harm requirements are being
invented to prevent the enforcement of privacy protections.
To sum up, courts have blocked statutory private rights of action by: (1) adding
a requirement for harm via standing; (2) interpreting statutes with statutory
damages in ways that require proof of harm to obtain statutory damages, thus
undercutting the purpose of statutory damages provisions; (3) interpreting
statutory private rights of action to require harm even when they do not have a
harm requirement; and (4) adopting narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to
exclude many types of harm.
The enforcement of privacy laws is a challenging issue, and unfortunately,
courts are making a mess of things. Courts often lack a theory of privacy harms
or any guiding principles. As Lauren Scholz observes, in many cases, the
“analysis as to why a harm is not present is often superficial or absent.”93
Decisions involving harm lack a coherent vision; they are creating mischief
rather than good policy.
C. HARM IN REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Regulators are often much less constrained by harm requirements. In many
cases, the laws that they enforce do not require harm. The enforcement of
statutes by regulators often occurs outside of the judicial system, so the issue of
harm never arises.
However, there are circumstances where harm is a requirement for regulators to
enforce, most notably Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement of
“unfair” acts or practices. Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has used its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the FTC Act to address privacy issues.94
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”95 A “deceptive” act or practice is a “material
representation, omission or practices that is likely to mislead a consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”96 There is no
mention of harm in this definition, though it does indicate that the deception
must be to the “detriment” of the consumer.
The definition of unfairness is much more directly focused on harm. An “unfair”
act or practice is one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
93

Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 Ind. L.J. 653, 662-63 (2019)
See Marcia Hofmann, The Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement of Privacy, PROSKAUER
ON PRIVACY (2012).
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15 U.S.C. § 45.
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94

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222

PRIVACY HARMS
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”97 This
definition explicitly includes “likely” harm. The FTC recognizes traditional
harms (and risks of such harms) such as economic and physical harms, but “more
subjective types of harm” such as emotional harm are usually not considered
substantial for unfairness purposes.98 On the other hand, the FTC is able to focus
on harm to consumers generally, which allows it to look to harm in a broader
manner than most tort and contracts cases, which involve specific individuals.
Although regulators are able to enforce less constrained by harm, they are often
limited in resources and must be highly selective about the matters they
enforce.99 State attorneys general vary considerably on how actively they
enforce; some are aggressive whereas others have not brought any enforcement
actions under many privacy laws that they are authorized to enforce.100
Because of these limitations, many privacy laws rely upon private litigation to
enforce the law. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is a prime
example of this type of enforcement mechanism. The law restricts unsolicited
commercial telemarketing calls, robocalls, and faxes, and it is enforced by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and state attorneys general. To
augment this enforcement, the law includes a private right of action with
statutory damages of $500 for each violation and $1500 for each knowing or
willful violation.101 Because the TCPA enforcement process is tedious and timeconsuming and because many TCPA cases involve small matters that do not
make splashy headlines, FCC enforcement has been modest.102 In one year, for
example, there were 47,704 complains but the FCC only issued 23 citations.103
In practice, private litigation has become the primary source of TCPA
enforcement.104
Litigation by private parties thus supplements enforcement by regulatory
agencies and state attorneys general, and in a number of instances, private
litigation serves as the primary enforcement mechanism of a law. Based on this
97

15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980),
Appended to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
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Co.,
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F.T.C.
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(1984),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm; Marcia Hofmann, The Federal Trade
Commission’s Enforcement of Privacy, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, at 2.
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Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note X, at 799.
100
Id. at 755 (“In the past fifteen years, a core group of states have taken the lead on privacy
enforcement: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
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47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).
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Id. at 378.
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enforcement role, private parties enforcing a law through private litigation are
often referred to as “private attorneys general.”105 As one court aptly explained,
the “award of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system,
and Congress is permitted to create legally enforceable bounty systems for
assistance in enforcing federal laws, provided the bounty is a reward for
redressing an injury of some sort (though not necessarily an injury to the bounty
hunter).”106 And, these cases typically require a showing a harm, which is often
the death knell if plaintiffs cannot show financial or physical harm.

II. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY HARMS
Privacy harms present several challenges that make it difficult for them to be
recognized.107 One challenge is that many privacy harms are small and caused
by a multitude of actors. Privacy harms often involve increased risk of future
harm, and the law struggles mightily to grapple with the concept of risk.108
Finally, privacy harms often have a significant societal dimension, and the law
(especially in litigation) often has a highly individualistic focus.
A. AGGREGATION OF SMALL HARMS
A major complicating dimension of many privacy harms is that they are small
but numerous. When these harms happen to an individual repeatedly by different
actors, they become significantly more harmful. For example, receiving an
unwanted email is a minor inconvenience. Receiving hundreds of unwanted
emails becomes a major imposition and distraction.
Another aspect of this difficulty is that sometimes an organization will cause a
very small amount of harm but on a very large scale – to millions or even billions
of people. From the standpoint of each individual, the harm is minor, but from
the standpoint of society, where the harm to everyone is aggregated, the total
amount of harm is quite substantial.
Privacy harms often involve the aggregation of many small harms to each
individual, which is compounded by the aggregation of all these harms to many
individuals. The result makes privacy violations large-scale problems that cause
a significant societal impact, but that do not fit readily into the traditional way
the law looks at harm.
FTC enforcement has successfully addressed the problem. In its policy statement
about unfairness injury, the FTC has noted: “An injury may be sufficiently
105

William B. Rubenstein, On What A "Private Attorney General" Is--And Why It Matters, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004).
106
Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).
107
See Ignacio N. Cofone and Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 Hastings L.J. 1039,
1041 (2018) (noting that “privacy harms are hard to pin down”).
108
Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note X.
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substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises
a significant risk of concrete harm.”109
However, when it comes to private litigation, for each individual, bringing a
lawsuit for a small harm is not be worth the time or resources. Class actions are
the predominant way to address this problem. Class actions allow for many
people to aggregate their small harms into a single lawsuit that is large enough
to justify the costs of litigating it.
Class actions, however, are an imperfect vehicle to address privacy problems.
Cases often quickly settle because the cost of litigating them is high. The lawyers
often earn significant sums, maximizing their own financial interests.110 Many
class actions become the equivalent to a shake down, with companies paying the
lawyers to go away.
If class actions do not settle, there is another problem. Companies have data on
millions or billions of people, and even small damages can add up to enormous
sums that can put companies out of business. These sums can become
disproportionate to what the company did wrong. Judges are reluctant to
recognize harm because it might mean bankrupting a company just to give each
person a very tiny amount of compensation.
B. RISK: UNKNOWABLE AND FUTURE HARMS
In many cases, the harm is not fully knowable, and the law struggles greatly to
address these situations. We explored this challenge for data breach harms in
Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms. 111 In that article, we note
that a major complication in recognizing harm from a data breach is that often
plaintiffs have not yet suffered from identity theft or fraud. Plaintiffs argue that
they suffer harm in the form of a future risk of injury. Courts are very
inconsistent in recognizing future risk of injury as a cognizable harm.112
Risk is involved with many different types of privacy harm. Even with privacy
harms that courts widely recognize, such as physical, economic, and reputational
harms, courts are reluctant to recognize them when there is only a risk that they
will occur. A credit report with inaccurate information like denoting someone as
a terrorist as in TransUnion poses a significant risk of economic and reputational
harm. Online posts that include someone’s home address present a risk of
physical attack.
109
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Privacy harms often not only involve a future risk of injury, but they are
compounded by an additional dimension of complexity: the range of possible
future injuries is much more varied. To fully understand the implications of the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal data, one must know about the future
uses to which the data will be put. For example, if Company A improperly
discloses personal data to Company B, the harm will depend upon what
Company B does with the data. Company B might not immediately use the data
in a harmful way and might not do so until after the statute of limitations.
Company B might never use the data in a harmful way.
Privacy harms are highly contextual, with the harm depending upon how the
data is used, what data is involved, and also how the data might be combined
with other data. Sharing an innocuous piece of data with another company might
provide a key link to other data or allow for certain inferences to be made.
Because of these difficulties, many privacy statutes use statutory damages. It is
far easier to enforce laws with statutory damages than to try to figure out the
harm which may involve future uses that may or may not occur. Through
standing doctrine and cases like Spokeo and TransUnion. however, courts are
undermining statutory damages provisions by forcing tired old judicial concepts
of harm into the enforcement of these statutes. For cases not involving statutes
with statutory damages, harm can become quite a speculative matter if there is
uncertainty in one of two dimensions – the possibility of harm and the nature of
harm.
C. INDIVIDUAL VS. SOCIETAL HARMS
Privacy harms often involve injury not just to individuals but to society. Several
scholars have argued that privacy is “constitutive” of society.113 As Joel
Reidenberg contends, [s]ociety as a whole has an important stake in the contours
of the protection of personal information.”114 Robert Post argues that the privacy
torts promote “rules of civility that in some significant measure constitute both
individuals and community.”115 According to Julie Cohen, privacy protects
individual autonomy and creativity that are essential for society to develop a rich

113

See, e.g., PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995) (arguing that privacy should
be understood in terms of its social benefits); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an
Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 709 (1987) (“[P]rivacy considerations no longer
arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”).
114
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 882-83
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scholarship. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (emphasizing
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culture.116 Paul Schwartz contends that privacy is essential to democracy and
freedom.117
These considerations are often omitted from the law’s evaluation of harm
because they do not fit the individualistic focus that courts have for cognizable
harm. Although certain lawsuits seek mainly to vindicate individual interests,
many group lawsuits (such as class actions) also seek to protect broader societal
interests. Courts, however, often still fail to consider the societal impact of
privacy harms even in these cases.

III. REALIGNING PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
AND REMEDIES
With the law’s relentless focus on privacy harms, it is easy to overlook the
broader challenges afoot. Privacy harms are just a piece of a larger pie involving
the enforcement of privacy law. In addition to the question of what should
constitute cognizable privacy harm, we should also ask whether privacy harm
should even be required in particular circumstances. In many cases, harm is
irrelevant to the purposes of the litigation. To determine when privacy harm is
an issue that should even be part of a case, we must answer a broader overarching
question: When and how should privacy law be enforced?
Many of the law’s difficulties with handling privacy cases are due to
misalignments between enforcement goals and remedies. Configuring the proper
alignment will make the law more coherent and effective.
Privacy law enforcement has three predominant goals:
(1) Compensation – compensating people who have been harmed
(2) Deterrence – preventing future violations of the law
(3) Equity – making things right by means other than compensation
Problems emerge when a remedy is misaligned with an enforcement goal. For
example, monetary damages are a proper remedy when compensation is the
goal. They are not a well-tailored remedy when deterrence or equity is the goal.
The law becomes messy and riddled with problems when it insists upon a single
remedy to address a multitude of goals. It is understandable why the law tries to
do this: sometimes multiple enforcement goals exist in the same case. If that is
so, then all of those goals should be addressed. But trying to use a remedy wellsuited for one goal but ill-suited for another is a recipe for failure.
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An analogy can deepen our understanding of the point. A wrench is a great tool
for unscrewing a nut. One could also try to use a wrench to hammer in a nail,
but a wrench is a poor tool to use, as it might cause damage. The nail requires a
hammer for its installation. The law is akin to a bad repairperson; it is constantly
trying to use the wrong tools to achieve enforcement goals. Just because in a
given situation there is a nut to unscrew and a nail to be hammered does not
mean that only a wrench or a hammer should be used. Both tools should be used.
This point might seem obvious, but the law almost entirely misses it. Modern
tort law is premised on the notion that lawsuits to compensate people with
damages can also double as a means to achieve deterrence. Of course, it is
certainly true that compensatory damages can further the goal of deterrence, but
this is akin to the use of the wrench to hammer in the nail – the wrench can be
used, but it is the wrong tool, and it will not work optimally. In privacy cases,
because of the challenging nature of privacy harms, the misfit in tools is
exacerbated.
A. THE GOALS OF ENFORCEMENT
Understanding the goals of enforcement is essential to making progress toward
the effective enforcement of privacy law. Compensation involves awarding a
plaintiff with monetary damages to provide redress for harm wrongfully caused.
The typical tort rule accords with this rationale by awarding damages equal to a
victim’s loss.118 Corrective justice theory embraces an Artistotelian concept of
justice that requires injurers to make victims whole.119 The goal is to hold actors
responsible for losses that they wrongfully caused.120
Deterrence involves imposing a penalty that deters future wrongdoing. Specific
deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing by the particular wrongdoer against
whom enforcement is sought. General deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing
by other actors. The penalty imposed on a particular wrongdoer will serve as a
lesson to teach others to avoid wrongdoing. Many organizations will only take
laws seriously when there are likely and painful consequences for failing to
comply.
Equity involves righting wrongs in situations where compensation is not an
adequate way of addressing them. Equitable remedies aim to restore things to
their original state before the wrongdoing or to help fix situations where
damages will not. The law has a number of equitable remedies, such as
injunctions and specific performance.121
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B. ALIGNING REMEDIES WITH GOALS
1. The Problem of Misalignment
The law suffers when it fails to align appropriate remedies with enforcement
goals. When compensation is the enforcement goal, compensatory damages are
the appropriate remedy, and these damages are based on harm. When deterrence
is the enforcement goal, private rights of action enable “private attorneys
general” to enforce a law. Compensatory damages are a misfit in many cases
unless there is harm. The remedy should be an amount that provides optimal
general and specific deterrence. When equity is the enforcement goal,
appropriate equitable remedies should be used. Harm should not be required.
The main issue should be whether there is a problem that can be fixed or
ameliorated with legal intervention.
Tort law attempts to achieve both the goal of compensation and deterrence
simultaneously. This attempt to do both might seem efficient, but the goals are
quite different. For example, when lawsuits are tied to compensatory damages,
the existence of liability insurance can complicate the goal of deterrence. When
the magnitude of the defendant’s insurance premiums does not track the
magnitude of the defendant’s liabilities, the threat of liability may fall short of
promoting optimal deterrence because the defendant can externalize the risk of
liability through the purchase of insurance.122
On the flip side, liability for compensatory damages can be far greater than is
optimal for deterrence. Compensation even for very small harms can become
outsized if multiplied by millions of people. Deterrence is the more meaningful
goal, and compensation in these instances might be counterproductive. For
example, providing a few cents to a billion individuals might do little for their
social welfare, but could put companies out of business. It might result in overdeterrence, leading companies to abandon socially beneficial personal data
practices.
2. The Value of Private Enforcement
In many instances, private litigation is used primarily as a vehicle to enforce a
law and thus to deploy law’s deterrence power. Legislatures often include a
private right of action in statutes so that plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys
general” will help enforce the law. The goal is to increase enforcement to deter
violations. In such cases, compensation is a secondary goal or a goal in only a
small number of cases. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Rosenbach v. Six
Flags Entertainment Corporation regarding the Illinois Biometric Information
122
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Privacy Act (BIPA), harm is not a requirement of the statute, and the legislature
included the private right of action not just to compensate plaintiffs but because
it “is integral to implementation of the legislature’s objectives” to deter BIPA
violations.123 In other words, the redress provides an incentive for plaintiffs and
counsel to enforce the law not for compensation’s sake but for deterrence.
Sone courts, however, miss the point about private attorneys general. For
example, in Stoops v. Wells Fargo, plaintiff Melody Stoops bought 35 cell
phones to try to ensnare companies that made telemarketing calls in violation of
the TCPA. The TCPA provides penalties of $500 for each violation with
penalties trebled for willful or knowing violations.124 The court dismissed her
case for lack of harm: “Plaintiff’s privacy interests were not violated when she
received calls from Defendant. . . Because Plaintiff has admitted that her only
purpose in using her cell phones is to file TCPA lawsuits, the calls are not ‘a
nuisance and an invasion of privacy.’”125 According to the court, “Plaintiff has
not suffered an injury-in-fact because her privacy and economic interests were
not violated when she received calls from Defendant.” The court reasoned that
“it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit” and
that “it is unfathomable that Congress considered a consumer who files TCPA
actions as a business when it enacted the TCPA.”126
Stoops may have been opportunistic, but her motives do not negate the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s activity or the fact that she suffered a
harm. Trying to catch a wrongdoer does not mean that one is unharmed by the
wrongdoer’s actions in the process. Ultimately, however, harm should not be
relevant to the Stoops case. Congress wrote the private right of action under the
TCPA without a requirement of harm. Deterrence is the goal, not compensation.
The fact that lawyers and plaintiffs benefit financially from enforcing privacy
laws is a necessary side effect of private rights of action. Litigation must be
sufficiently remunerative to incentivize private enforcement.
Contrary to the court’s view of Stoops’s actions, she engaged in crucially
important activity. She helped catch privacy violators and took the time to
enforce the TCPA, which is what federal lawmakers sought to incentivize. She
held privacy violators accountable when enforcement agencies did not. The
main benefit of a private right of action in a law is to encourage private
enforcement of that law because government agencies often lack the resources
to enforce a law rigorously and consistently enough.
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3. An Approach for Realignment
In privacy cases, how should the law better align the goals of enforcement with
remedies? When should harm be required? In our view, harm should be an issue
only to the extent that compensation is the enforcement goal. In many instances
of privacy litigation, the enforcement goals involve deterrence and equity, not
compensation. For these cases, harm should be legally irrelevant. The amount
of damages in such cases should be tailored to the enforcement goal. When the
goal is deterrence, attempting to conjure up some amount of compensation
(often based on pretext) will not be optimal for achieving this goal. The issue of
harm just gets in the way and confuses matters when the essential issue is clear:
What amount of damages would be optimal for deterrence?
For cases where equity is the goal, non-monetary remedies should be imposed.
Redressing harm can certainly be one of the aims of equity, but goals of equity
extend far beyond traditional conceptions of harm. Equity is a way to right
wrongs—to stop wrongs from continuing without end.
More specifically, we propose the following approach: First, courts should
require harm to the extent that claims are brought to secure compensation.
Establishing harm should be restricted only to the ability to obtain compensatory
damages. To the extent that tort claims seek equitable relief, they should not turn
on harm.
Second, for contract cases, courts should enforce the contract. Courts should use
remedies, such as specific enforcement, restitution, or recission. Attorneys’ fees
and some modest damages should be paid to compensate for the time and hassle
of having to litigate to make the defendant adhere to the contract.
Third, courts should not inject harm into cases involving privacy statutes that
have private rights of action. Modern standing doctrine has strayed too far from
the Constitutional requirement of “cases” or “controversies” to shut the doors to
the courts to many cases that should be heard. Standing has become a conceptual
mess, with courts spending too much time questioning harm and losing sight of
the important issues.
Standing doctrine is a significant impediment to the coherent operation of
privacy laws. Standing forces harm into cases where it should not be. Spokeo is
part of a lineage of Supreme Court cases that shifted to a harms-based approach
as a mechanism to shut off courts as a means for achieving social justice.
According to Cass Sunstein, modern standing doctrine is an attack on the
enforceability of much modern regulation: “[T]he very notion of ‘injury in fact’
is not merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and
Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake.”127 Sunstein argues that the
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 167 (1992).
127
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injury-in-fact requirement “injects common law conceptions of harm into the
Constitution.”128 It purports to be a “purely factual inquiry” but is “inevitably a
product of courts' value-laden judgments.”129
Likewise, Felix Wu argues that “standing law seems to be serving no purpose
other than to constitutionalize a deregulatory agenda.”130 “Until recently,” Wu
observes, “tangibility and other questions about the quality of the harm suffered
by the plaintiff simply were not part of the Supreme Court's standing analysis.
Lower courts nevertheless incorporated such considerations into their analyses
of standing in privacy cases. The Supreme Court has now done the same, thus
shifting the law on standing, while professing that nothing has changed.”131 As
Rachel Bayefsky notes, before the shift in standing doctrine, instead of requiring
harm, courts required merely a “legal right” to bring a lawsuit based on property,
contract, tort, or statute.132
Dissenting in TransUnion v. Ramire,133 Justice Thomas observes that the
requirement of concrete harm is a relative late addition to standing doctrine and
did not exist for nearly two centuries.134 At the founding, “Where an individual
sought to sue someone for a violation of his private rights, such as trespass on
his land, the plaintiff needed only to allege the violation.”135 Justice Thomas also
notes that the First Congress enacted a copyright law that provides for damages
without showing a monetary loss.136
Spokeo and TransUnion’s invitation to courts to look to historically recognized
harms in the common law further ossifies the common law’s protection of
privacy beyond the ossification already caused by Prosser.137 Warren and
Brandeis aimed to generate new causes of action to rise to the problems; locking
down privacy law to four narrow torts contravenes the very spirt of their article.
For Warren and Brandeis, the common law looks not just backwards but
forwards as well. The common law is progressive, not regressive.
The requirement of harm in standing that overrides private rights of action in
laws invites judicial overreaching. Courts should approach statutory private
rights of action with more humility. Legislatures do not provide private rights of
action loosely. Private rights of action are one of the most contested elements of
128
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laws, and when legislatures deem that violations of a law require the recognition
of private rights of action, judges ought to show more respect for the legislature’s
determination.
Nullifying this enforcement component of the law can thwart the way the law is
supposed to work. When Congress passes statutes, it will sometimes preempt
state laws on the same issue, so plaintiffs might be barred from suing in state
court for state law violations. Preemption is a kind of bargain, where plaintiffs
might lose out on pursuing actions in state court but will be allowed instead to
pursue actions in federal court based on the federal statute. This is how FCRA
works, as it preempts certain state laws and directs plaintiffs to sue under its
provisions.138 When Congress enacted FCRA, its private right of action was
included in exchange for restricting state privacy and defamation tort actions.139
Plainly said, the Supreme Court has turned an explicit trade by Congress into a
gift to defendants. Plaintiffs were stripped of their ability to seek tort redress but
provided a right to sue under federal law. Now, they are denied both tort redress
and its substitute because courts have decided that they lack standing to seek
redress under the alternative cause of action provided by FCRA. By requiring
harm, courts are pulling the rug out from the bargain, leaving plaintiffs with
nowhere to pursue their cases.
Congress weighs various enforcement mechanisms from agency enforcement to
state attorney general enforcement to private rights of action. Many statutes have
a mix of different types of enforcement. Through those choices, Congress has
determined the efficacy of that particular enforcement mix. When courts nullify
a component of Congress’s enforcement mix, they undermine the statutory
recipe.
Focusing on individual harm for these latter types of lawsuits is missing the point
and purpose of the lawsuit. Many class action lawsuits would not be worth the
significant costs if their sole benefit were to compensate individuals for any
harm. For many class action lawsuits, the amount of compensation individuals
receive is trivial. If this were the main benefit of these lawsuits, then we ought
to reconsider whether they are worth the costs. The real value of many class
action lawsuits is in holding defendants accountable for their wrongdoing and
thus to determine them specifically and other similarly situated entities generally
when the harm is of a nature that is small and dispersed.
The law must break away from the rigid formalistic approach that anytime there
is even a very small harm, it warrants compensatory damages. The law should
also eschew its rigidity in dismissing cases when there is no cognizable harm.
FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §1681h (permitting state tort actions only when defendants act with “malice
or willful intent to injure plaintiff”).
139
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The rigidity makes litigation fit quite poorly with enforcement goals.
In class action cases where there may be only a small harm to individuals, courts
should be able to fashion a remedy without resorting to compensatory damages.
Compensatory damages for large classes could end up adding to an excessive
sum beyond that necessary to achieve the optimal deterrence. A miniscule
amount of damages for each class member will not address the goal of
compensation in a meaningful way. In such a situation, the enforcement goal is
the meaningful one, and this goal should be the driver of the appropriate remedy.
In other cases, the amount of compensatory damages might be too low for
optimal enforcement. If the compensation to the class is minimal, then
compensatory damages are not a meaningful remedy, and courts should be able
to fashion a more appropriate remedy with punitive damages or equitable relief.
To avoid unnecessary class action lawsuits, in statutory cases where only
deterrence is a goal, and compensation is not involved, courts might be given
the option of evaluating the extent to which the statute has already been
enforced. If a regulatory agency has already enforced a law effectively for the
violation, then the statute might have a requirement for establishing harm, as the
only goal of a lawsuit under these circumstances would be compensation.
Legislatures could write laws to permit courts to dismiss lawsuits in situations
where regulatory enforcement has been sufficient for deterrence and other
enforcement goals are not present.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY
RECOGNIZING PRIVACY HARMS
As we argued in the previous Part, properly recognizing privacy harms is
essential to privacy litigation. Under the current U.S. approach to litigation,
harm plays a central gatekeeping role in many instances, and failing to recognize
privacy harm shuts down important cases and prevents many privacy statutes
from being effectively enforced. Under our proposed approach, harm would play
much less of a gatekeeping role in litigation. Standing doctrine would be restored
to what it was before the Court dramatically twisted it to the detriment of privacy
policy and law. Harm would need to be established only in cases involving
compensatory damages, but otherwise, it would not be required.
Because our approach would require a rather substantial change in current law,
establishing harm is likely to remain a key component for most privacy cases.
Even if our approach were adopted, establishing harm still would play an
important role, just not its current oversized one.
Recognizing privacy harms is important beyond litigation. There is an
expressive value to recognizing harm that helps victims cope and heal, changes
the social meaning of certain activity, and shapes societal norms and practices.
29
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Legislatures must properly recognize privacy harms in order to craft laws that
provide adequate protection and avoid troublesome gaps in legislation.
Regulators must properly recognize privacy harms to direct enforcement
resources and develop enforcement strategies.
A. PROPERLY IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS AT STAKE
As a result of the current approach to harm, some courts locate harm in certain
rather trivial costs or use of resources. Finding harm for these things is really a
pretext for different types of harms. Because courts require plaintiffs to allege
tangible and concrete harms, complaints endeavor to lay out concrete harms that
are not the heart of the matter at all. It is those harms that enable plaintiffs to get
beyond motions to dismiss even though they are miniscule and—crucially—do
not capture why plaintiffs are suing in the first place.
One theory that has gained some traction is that plaintiffs suffered harm in losing
device battery life and storage space based on broken privacy promises.140 In In
re iPhone Application Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Apple breached
promises in its privacy policy to protect users’ personal data because its
operating system readily facilitated the non-consensual collection and use of
their data by apps. The court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged harm
in claiming that the “unauthorized transmission of data from their iPhones taxed
the phones’ resources by draining the battery and using up storage space and
bandwidth.”141
In Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., the court held that unwanted calls to prepaid cell
phones “cause direct, concrete, monetary injury by depleting limited minutes
that the consumer has paid for” and also “deplete a cell phone’s battery, and the
cost of electricity to recharge he phone.” The court noted that “[w]hile certainly
small, the cost is real, and the cumulative effect could be consequential.” 142 As
another court noted, although the harm from “a single call or text (whether from
depleted battery life, wasted time, or annoyance) would be de minimis,” the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) “is clear that a violation can occur
from a single call.”143 As another court has noted: “Regardless of how small the
harm is, it is actual and it is real.”144
In those cases, the actual harm to plaintiffs, however, was not lost storage space
or slightly drained resources. The problem wasn’t the cost of electricity or the
cost of phone minutes. The litigants invoked those costs because judicial
decisions forced their hand—those financial costs were the only ones at hand
140
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even though the real privacy harms lay elsewhere, as we shall explore in the next
Part. Yes, those costs sounded in the language that courts had chosen to accept
but not because they fit what plaintiffs suffered. We have seen the emergence of
an odd sort of legal fiction, where the law redresses “harm” that is not the real
interest interfered with as a means to redress a harm that really is.
The law fails to focus on what matters most, which is whether certain practices
actually create privacy problems that set back privacy interests that we should
care about. Lucky plaintiffs can conjure up some sort of minor tangible impact
that often has little really to do with privacy. By contrast, plaintiffs who can
point to a severe problem that does not involve a negligible tangible impact are
out of luck. The law perversely redresses trivial things rather while ignoring
major problems and real costs to individuals, groups, and society.
It is essential to properly identify the interests at stake. Using other types of harm
as pretexts results in a balancing of interests based on fictions, leading to
haphazard results in cases. This is a recipe for an arbitrary and incoherent body
of law.
B. THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF RECOGNIZING HARM
We lose something important when courts fail to articulate privacy harms
appropriately. Looking for irrelevant financial or physical harms and ignoring
a vast array of real tangible and intangible privacy harms sends the message that
privacy harms do not matter. We lose the chance to harness the educative power
of law.
In addition to its coercive role, law has a crucial expressive character.145 Law is
a teacher, creating “a public set of meanings and shared understandings between
the state and the public.”146 The law changes the social meaning of conduct.147
It draws our attention to privacy violations and proclaims that they are wrong.
In creating and shaping social norms, law has “an important cultural impact that
differs from its more direct coercive effects.”148
Individuals whose privacy has been violated need to hear the message that law
is concerned with the harms they have suffered. Law’s recognition of privacy
harms tells individuals that their suffering is real and that their suffering is not
just a fact of life that should be endured, but harm that should not be tolerated.149
Individuals can see themselves as harmed.
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In clarifying and recognizing privacy harms, the law can provide lessons for
wrongdoers. By doing so, the law can declare that the privacy harms that
defendants inflict will not be tolerated. The law can demand that wrongdoers
internalize the costs that they slough off onto others.150
Society would receive the message too. Law can ensure that privacy harms are
part of the calculus for individuals or companies handling personal data. As
companies and startups design new gadgets and services, the law can make them
consider the importance of not creating privacy harms.151
Failing to recognize privacy harm sends the opposite message, one that is quite
malignant. When cases are dismissed for lack of harm in the face of violations
of privacy law, the message is that these violations do not matter. Organizations
learn that they do not need to take the law seriously. Denials of standing for
statutory violations belittles protections in privacy statutes. These expressive
messages undermine compliance with laws.
C. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY AGENDA
Improving the recognition of privacy harms not only would benefit privacy
litigation, but it would also enhance the legislative crafting of privacy laws as
well as the agenda of regulators that enforce privacy laws.
U.S. states have been aggressively proposing and passing new privacy laws.152
Several states, such as California, Virginia, and Colorado, have passed broad
privacy laws within the past few years.153 As many laws are focused on
protecting consumers from harm, the specific protections they provide depend
upon the legislature’s understanding of privacy harms. If particular activities are
not considered to be harmful, then privacy laws often do not address these
activities or fail to address them with sufficient rigor.
The recognition of privacy harms also might affect the agenda for regulatory
enforcement agencies. Violations of privacy laws that are understood to cause
harm to consumers are more likely to spark an investigation and enforcement
action. Regulators have limited resources and can pursue only a fraction of
violations.154 Failing to recognize harm for certain types of violations might lead
to precious enforcement resources being used elsewhere.
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V. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVACY HARMS
Privacy harms have been a challenge to conceptualize because they are so
varied. Privacy is an umbrella concept that encompasses different yet related
things.155 It is no surprise that privacy harms involve different yet related
concerns. Privacy harms not only differ in type but also in their severity.
In this Part, we discuss the various types of privacy harms and whether the law
currently recognizes them.156 For many types of privacy harm, the law lacks
clarity and consistency as to whether the harm is cognizable. We contend that
in most cases, these distinct types of harms should be treated as cognizable
harms. For several of these types of harms, there is support in caselaw and
doctrines in other contexts to support recognition of cognizable harm. In many
circumstances, courts recognize the direct harm for certain types of harm but fail
to recognize the risk of harm. Our typology of privacy harms is set forth in the
figure below.

Our typology groups privacy harms into seven basic types: (1) physical
155
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harms; (2) economic harms; (3) reputational harms; (4) psychological harms;
(5) autonomy harms; (6) discrimination harms; and (7) relationship harms. We
identify several different distinct subtypes of psychological and autonomy
harms.
A. PHYSICAL HARMS
Privacy violations can lead to physical harms, which are harms that result in
bodily injury or death. Physical harms are well-recognized as cognizable under
the law. Indeed, setbacks to physical health, where clear and obvious, have rarely
been disputed as cognizable harms.
The improper sharing of personal data can create unique opportunities for
physical violence. Rebecca Schaeffer, a model and actress, was murdered after
a stalker obtained her home address with the help of a private investigator who
obtained it from California motor vehicles records. The Internet has made it even
easier for such sharing of personal data to lead to physical assault. In December
2009, an online advertisement on Craigslist featured a woman’s photograph next
to her “interest” in “a real aggressive man with no concern for women.” The
woman’s ex-boyfriend Jebidiah Stipe wrote the post.157 More than 160 people
responded to the ad, including Ty McDowell.158 Stipe sent McDowell text
messages with the woman’s home address and false claims of her fantasies about
“humiliation, physical abuse, and sexual abuse.” McDowell attacked the woman
as she returned home, forcing his way inside. At knifepoint, he raped her and
abused her with a knife sharpener.159 When caught by the police, McDowell said
that the woman had asked him to rape her.160
Entities handling personal data have been found liable for negligently,
knowingly, or purposefully paving the way for a third party to physically injure
someone. In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,161 a disturbed man named Liam
Youens purchased personal data about Amy Boyer from data broker
Docusearch.162 To satisfy Youens’s request for the address of Boyer’s employer,
Docusearch hired a person to find out by calling Boyer, lying to her about the
Brian, “Craigslist Rapists Get 60 to Life: Ad Seeking Someone with ‘No Regard’ for Women
Led
to
Rape,”
Victimized
over
the
AOC
(blog),
July
3,
2010,
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158 William Browning, “Wyo. Craigslist Rape Victim Speaks for the First Time,” AP Alert,
September 24, 2010.
159 William Browning, “Details Emerge in Web Rape Case,” Star-Tribune (WY), February 5,
2010, http://trib.com/news/local/article_edb73077-0bbc-5bc2-b9ea-b3fe5c9aedce.html; Pete
Kotz, “Jebidiah Stipe Used Craigslist Rape Fantasy Ad to Get Revenge on Ex Girlfriend,” True
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February
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2010
(11:13
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reason for the call and inducing her to reveal the address. 163 Docusearch gave
the address to Youens who then confronted Boyer at work and killed her.164
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the broker had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in releasing information to a third party due to the foreseeable
risk of criminal conduct. A private investigator “owes a duty to exercise
reasonable care not to subject a third person to an unreasonable risk of harm.”165
For the court, the risk of criminal misconduct was sufficiently foreseeable so
that an “investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third
person’s personal information to a client.” According to the court, information
brokers should know that stalkers often use their services to obtain personal data
about victims.
Privacy claims involving the negligent enablement of physical injuries can be
traced to premises liability cases. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Apartment Corp.,166 the plaintiff was attacked and robbed in the hallway just
outside her apartment. The landlord left the building unguarded even though
tenants had been assaulted and robbed in the building’s common areas.167 The
court held that residential apartment owners had a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect tenants from third party violence.168 The landlord was in a better
position than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures and better situated than
the police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on its premises.169
Although courts clearly recognize harm from physical injuries, courts are
reluctant to hold online service providers responsible when their activities
promote, facilitate, or enable such harm. The physical harm facilitated via online
stalking is akin to the physical injuries that result when landlords fail to secure
their property. In cases involving owners of residential property, hospitals, day
care centers, and shopping malls, courts have extended liability to the owners
for a third party’s criminal acts 170 Similar to these owners, online platforms and
service providers exercise control over the use and security of their services,
courts treat them differently.171 Due in part to Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act and the legal shield it provides, courts have not
taken up the invitation to treat digital spaces with the same set of rules as with
physical places.172
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Courts sometimes struggle with cases involving the disclosure of personal data
that creates a risk of physical harm but that still has not resulted in actual
physical injury. Doxing – the disclosure of personal data to facilitate people
being located, contacted, and harassed – creates a serious threat of physical
harm. Courts often focus on the nature of the data involved, which is often
innocuous in the abstract, such as home addresses. Such information may
already be available online from other sources. But when this data is used to dox
victims, the data no longer is innocuous. Courts are generally reluctant to view
the disclosure of home addresses as harmful (or even as a violation of privacy)
unless plaintiffs have done everything that they can to keep their home addresses
from the public (such as removing their addresses from the white pages).173
A few courts have recognized the harm. For example, in Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, an anti-abortion activist group doxed
abortion doctors. Some of these doctors were murdered, and the living ones
whose personal information was posted online sued and argued that they feared
for their safety. The court sided with the doctors.174 Cases like Planned
Parenthood are rare, however, and few plaintiffs have been able to use litigation
to combat doxing.
Doxing actually involves a fusion of two types of harm – a risk of physical harm
as well as psychological harm consisting of the fear that accompanies this risk.
In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis observed back in 1890 that the
law had matured sufficiently to recognize not just physical injuries as harms but
also the fear of such injuries. They noted that “with the recognition of the legal
value of sensations, the protection against actual bodily injury was extended to
prohibit mere attempts to do such injury; that is, the putting another in fear of
such injury. From the action of battery grew that of assault.”175 They observed
that these developments in the law “came with the advance of civilization.”176
We will discuss psychological harms later on.
B. ECONOMIC HARMS
Economic harms involve monetary losses or a loss in the value of something.
Privacy violations can result in financial losses that the law has long understood
as cognizable harm. Even small economic harms are deemed cognizable by
Mich. L. Rev. 1073 (2020); Danielle Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017).
173
See, e.g., Benz v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Co., 2006 WL 2844896 (D.D.C. Sept.
29, 2006) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s public disclosure claim stemming from defendant’s
publication of her home address online next to the suggestion that she was interested in sex
because her home address was not listed in the phone book).
174
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
175
Warren & Brandies, Right to Privacy, supra note __, at X.
176
Id.

36
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222

PRIVACY HARMS
courts.177 In cases involving identity theft, plaintiffs can prove harm when
identity thieves steal their personal data and use it to conduct fraudulent
transactions in their names.178 Difficulties arise if plaintiffs are eventually able
to clear up the financial pollution left by identity thieves. Suppose an identity
thief takes out a credit card in a victim’s name. The victim spends a considerable
amount of time clearing up the mess and establishing that the debt is not the
victim’s responsibility. Victims might argue that their time, stress, and anxiety
to mitigate future economic harm should be compensated, but courts often look
askance as these things as bases for cognizable harm.179 Many cases involving
economic harm are data breach cases. As we noted in our article on data breach
harms, plaintiffs have difficulty providing a causal link between particular data
breaches and identity theft.180 Moreover, in many cases, the identity theft has
not yet occurred, and many courts refuse to recognize a harm for the risk of
future economic loss.181
In cases involving the use and sharing of personal data, courts often refuse to
find economic harm. In Dwyer v. American Express,182 a group of cardholders
sued American Express for creating profiles of them based on their spending
habits and using these profiles for marketing. The cardholders argued that this
activity was a violation of the tort of appropriation of name or likeness. They
contended that American Express appropriated for its own use or benefit their
names or likenesses without their consent. The court, however, concluded that
although “each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants,” the value of the
American Express lists was due to its “categorizing and aggregating these
names.” American Express’s use of the information does “not deprive any of the
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”183 Thus, the
cardholders could not establish harm.
Many privacy violations involve the loss of important opportunities rather than
direct financial injuries. We could not find any privacy cases recognizing a harm
for loss of productivity or time to deal with privacy violations. In other contexts,
however, courts readily recognize a similar type of harm. For example, courts
recognize loss of consortium, which is defined as the “conjugal fellowship of
husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection,
and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.”184 The concept of “consortium”
translates the loss of quality time into an economic harm. Although this concept
has firm roots in the law, it has not developed to encompass the loss of quality
177
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time more generally and has not become part of privacy cases.
Another area of struggle in recognizing economic harms is when risk is
involved. As we argue extensively in our article, Risk and Anxiety, courts are
often uncomfortable with risk, and they cling to notions of vested harm even
though risk is a concept thoroughly embraced in other domains such as
insurance, business, and public health, among others.185 Several cases involve
organizations that fail to follow security safeguards, creating risks that make
people more vulnerable to potential future harm. Courts are inconsistent in
finding harm under these circumstances. For example, the FCRA mandates that
no more than five digits from a credit card number can be printed on a receipt,
but far more digits are printed on receipts in violation of the mandate. In cases
where this provision is violated, some courts have held that there is an injury,
and other courts have concluded that there is none.186
Consider these opposing findings. In Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit held that printing more digits of a person’s credit card on a
receipt is an injury in fact because it is akin to a breach of confidentiality.187
However, in Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded
that printing more credit card digits on a receipt was not a sufficient harm
because Bassett did not allege that another copy of the receipt existed, that his
receipt was lost or stolen, that he was the victim of identity theft, or even that
another person apart from his lawyers viewed the receipt.”188
At first blush, the Basset court notes a number of things that seemingly make the
risk of future harm from the receipt low. But having the information on the
receipt presents a risk if the receipt is lost or thrown away. The law’s restriction
of the digits on the receipt is not to shield the data from the customer who bought
something and has the receipt. Instead, it is to enable everyone to be able to
throw away receipts without having to worry about shredding them. This
commitment promotes good security and alleviates the need for people to go to
greater lengths to protect themselves.
In contrast to courts, the FTC has enforced against companies with inadequate
security in the absence of a data breach. For example, in In the Matter of
Microsoft Corp., the FTC faulted Microsoft for failing to follow the promises it
made about the security of a single login service.189 In In re Guess.com, Inc.,
the FTC enforced on a similar deception theory.190 More recently, in In the
Matter of Zoom Video Communications, Inc., the FTC used an unfairness theory
185
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to fault Zoom for “limiting the intended benefit of a privacy and security
safeguard provided by [the] Safari browser.”191 This created a “vulnerability” on
users’ computers, but the enforcement was not based on any malicious actors
actually exploiting this vulnerability.
C. REPUTATIONAL HARMS
Reputational harms involve injuries to an individual’s reputation and standing
in the community. Privacy violations can result in reputational injuries, which
have a long history of recognition. Reputational harms impair a person’s ability
to maintain “personal esteem in the eyes of others” and can taint a person’s
image.192 They can result in lost business, employment, or social rejection.
The law has treated reputational harms as distinct from physical and property
injuries. As Justice Potter Stewart remarked of defamation law, an individual’s
right to the protection of his good name reflects “our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being.”193 Under the umbrella of
defamation law, the torts of libel and slander impose liability when a person
makes a “false and defamatory statement concerning another.”194 The tort of
false light, which emerged out of the Warren and Brandeis article, protects
against widely publicizing “a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”195
A longstanding rule in defamation law is that certain defamatory falsehoods
(such as the claim that someone has a sexually transmitted disease) warrant the
recovery of damages without evidentiary proof.196 Although presumed damages
have been disallowed for defamation lawsuits by public officials and public
figures, such damages are permitted in a “vast number of cases.”197
Additionally, in other cases where plaintiffs must prove reputational damage but
cannot do so, they still may obtain “nominal damages” – typically one dollar.198
Although common in defamation cases, nominal damages are not restricted to
defamation.199 As Megan Cambre notes, “An award of nominal damages
recognizes that a plaintiff’s right has been violated. It further provides recovery
for that legal wrong.”200 There is currently a circuit split on whether nominal
191
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damages are sufficient to confer standing.201
In at least one case, a court recognized reputational harm caused indirectly when
personal data was misused by a social media platform to grow membership in
the platform’s user base. In Perkins v. LinkedIn, the professional social network
site downloaded users’ email contacts, using them to ask users’ contacts to
connect on the site without the users’ permission. Users sued LinkedIn on the
grounds that sending repeated invitations to their contacts caused them
reputational harm because their contacts might think that they sent the repeated
invitations. The court concluded that they had alleged cognizable harm – that
LinkedIn engaged in misleading commercial speech causing injury.202
A significant risk of reputational harm can be created by sloppy, incomplete, and
incorrect records. Many privacy laws require that organizations adhere to the
principle of “data quality” – keeping data accurate, complete, and up-to-date.203
Courts are inconsistent in whether inaccuracies in data constitutes a cognizable
harm. To return to Spokeo, the Court was skeptical about whether inaccurate
data rose to the level of being cognizable. Recall that the plaintiff had
complained about errors in his consumer report that falsely stated that he was
married and had professional degrees. The Court did not examine the specific
errors that the plaintiff complained about. Instead, the Court spoke generally
about errors: “An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code.
It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without
more, could work any concrete harm.”204 Unfortunately, the Court chose a rather
poor example, as a lot can be inferred about a person based on their zip code.
Numerous demographic generalizations can be made about many zip codes
about race, religion, ethnicity, income, and more.
The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the
errors in the plaintiff’s records were sufficiently harmful. On remand, the Ninth
Circuit held Robins had alleged a cognizable harm.205 The court noted that
accuracy and other components of data quality involved “interests protected by
FCRA's procedural requirements are ‘real,’ rather than purely legal
creations.”206 According to the court, “given the ubiquity and importance of
consumer reports in modern life—in employment decisions, in loan
applications, in home purchases, and much more—the real-world implications
of material inaccuracies in those reports seem patent on their face.”207 Further,
the court observed that “[c]ourts have long entertained causes of action to
vindicate intangible harms caused by certain untruthful disclosures about
201
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individuals, and we respect Congress's judgment that a similar harm would result
from inaccurate credit reporting.”208
However, courts are more reluctant to find harm for errors in records without
disclosure to others. These situations involve a significant risk of harm, so they
are akin to the future risk of harm cases in data breach litigation. A key case
regarding erroneous records is the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
TransUnion v. Ramire.209 As discussed earlier, TransUnion falsely noted in the
plaintiffs’ credit records that they were potential terrorists. The Court held that
even information this damaging does not create a concrete injury unless it is
disclosed to third parties.210
Finding specific harms for incorrect information in records can be challenging
because errors or missions could lead to a variety of consequences at some point
in the future, long beyond the statute of limitations for most causes of action.
Suppose, for example, that a credit report erroneously states that a person went
bankrupt. Whether the error causes any harm will depend upon how the report
is used. A wise person would likely refrain from seeking a loan while the error
remains in the report, as this could result in denial of the loan or a higher interest
rate. For example, in Sarver v. Experian, the court held that the plaintiff failed
to establish actual damages based on an inaccurate bankruptcy notation in his
credit report before he tried to apply for credit from a third party. Afterwards,
he could establish damages.211 But to have courts recognize harm, should a
person have to go through the charade of applying for a loan in order to generate
proof of economic harm?
In TransUnion, TransUnion’s FCRA violations also involved the failure to
notify the plaintiffs that their records labeled them as potential terrorists and to
inform them about their rights to respond to this matter. The Supreme Court’s
view that there is no harm for these violations prevents plaintiffs from enforcing
these provisions of the law, which exist to help people prevent harmful errors
from wreaking havoc on their lives. Such a view is akin to saying that cancer
does not cause harm until it metastasizes and spreads to vital organs.
Recognizing harm before it becomes more severe is essential to preventing
needless injury and suffering. To use another analogy, waiting until a train has
gone over a cliff is a foolhardy trigger for a corrective intervention. A clear risk
is sufficiently concrete.
Inaccuracies create risk of future harm that are difficult to predict, but they are
still harmful in the present day because they cause a loss of data hygiene.
Imagine that someone that you invited into your house takes all your clothes out
of the drawers and closets and throws them on the floor. The person removes all
208
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your books from the shelves and shoves them in a corner. The person tracks dirt
all over your floors, though it does not permanently stain them. No structural
damage is done to the house, but it is now a mess. You have been harmed even
though the value of your home is not diminished. You have suffered a loss. You
would likely find the mess and dirt in your home to be unpleasant. You might
not invite guests over to your home until it is cleaned. The harm is not the
diminishment in value of the house; it is interference with your enjoyment of
your home as well as the time and expense to clean up the mess. When data is
sullied with misleading or incorrect information, there is a similar mess – just
one in digital space rather than in a physical place. And, unlike in real space, the
contamination can be difficult to eradicate. It can be hard for individuals to find
out about errors and when they do, third parties will ignore requests to correct
them without the real risk of litigation costs.
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMS
Psychological harms involve a range of negative mental responses, such as
anxiety, anguish, concern, irritation, disruption, or aggravation. Although there
is a wide array of feelings that can arise from privacy violations, most can be
categorized into one of two general types – emotional distress or disturbance.
Emotional distress involves painful or unpleasant feelings. Disturbance involves
disruption to tranquility and peace of mind.
1. Emotional Distress
One of the most common types of harm caused by privacy violations is
emotional distress. Emotional distress encompasses a wide range of emotions,
including annoyance, frustration, fear, embarrassment, anger, and various
degrees of anxiety.
The impact of emotional harm varies depending upon the emotion triggered.
Fear can be among the most damaging emotions given its impact on people’s
life choices. One of us has chronicled the devastating impact that fear has had
on women who faced a perfect storm of impersonation, doxing, nude photos,
and threats online.212 Privacy violations can cause emotional distress that can
impede someone’s life as much as certain physical injuries. The emotional toll
of identity theft can adversely affect victims’ work and relationships.213
Courts, however, have struggled with how to recognize emotional distress as a
cognizable harm, resulting in a messy and inconsistent body of caselaw. In one
sphere of tort law—the privacy torts spawned from Warren and Brandeis’s
article—courts have consistently recognized emotional distress alone as
212
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cognizable harm. The privacy torts, however, are more of an exception than the
rule. The special oasis afforded to the privacy torts likely is due to their genesis
from the Warren and Brandeis article, which emphatically noted that privacy
violations primarily involve an “injury to the feelings.”214 Privacy invasions
interfered with a person’s “estimate of himself,” inflicting “mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”215
Specifically addressing judicial reluctance to recognizing emotional harm,
Warren and Brandeis began by noting how the common law had matured to
recognize and redress a variety of types of intangible harms beyond physical
ones. “[I]n early times,” they wrote, “the law gave a remedy only for physical
interference with life and property.”216 Subsequently, the law expanded to
recognize incorporeal injuries; “[f]rom the action of battery grew that of assault.
Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive
noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of
nuisance was developed.”217 They noted how defamation law protected a
person’s name without requiring proof of financial or physical harm. 218 In
essence, Warren and Brandeis argued that recognition of emotional harm was a
sign of a more advanced civilization, and by implication, failure to do so would
be crude and uncivilized. Because Warren and Brandeis tied the privacy torts so
tightly to emotional harm, it would be somewhat odd and nonsensical for courts
to recognize the privacy torts but not allow pure emotional harms for recovery.
Privacy tort cases readily allow emotional distress as the sole basis of harm.219
Cases “collectively reject any suggestion that special damages or physical
injuries are a threshold pre-condition to recovery.”220 Courts have recognized as
cognizable harms feelings of violation, mortification, fear, humiliation, and
embarrassment, among other things.221 The Restatement of Torts clearly
indicates that plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress alone.222
In countless privacy tort cases, courts do not question the viability of the harm.223
The issue is so clear and settled that courts do not even bother to mention it.
Oddly, beyond the four privacy torts, courts view pure emotional distress with
skepticism. Perhaps this odd disjunction is due to judges being relatively
unfamiliar with the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, and thus they lack an
appreciation of the clear recognition of emotional distress in these cases.
214
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In contract law, courts have been reluctant to recognize emotional harm, but they
have shifted on this issue to move toward a greater allowance of recovery for
emotional harm. The general rule is that emotional distress damages are not
permitted for breach of contract. The rule emerges from the famous English case
from 1854, Hadley v. Baxendale.224 Although Hadley is the prevailing rule, it
was once considered a radical departure from the existing rule that damages for
breach of contract could encompass all losses suffered by the plaintiff, including
emotional distress. Hadley was part of a general movement in England to limit
the discretion of juries and to shift more power to judges.225 Justifications for the
Hadley rule in U.S. contract law are based on fears of fabricated claims,
disproportionate compensation, and unforeseeable damages.226
Nonetheless, courts have been making a number of exceptions to the Hadley
rule, such as “when the breach is willful or wanton in nature of if the breach
causes bodily harm.”227 Another exception is when the “contract is personal in
nature,” such as contracts to take photographs, to supply wedding dresses, or to
perform cosmetic surgery.228 As one commentator has noted, “courts have
frequently allowed non-economic damages in breach of contract actions, despite
forging the limiting rule, and clearly ‘have not applied it inflexibly.’”229
Although the law of recovery of emotional distress damages from contracts is in
flux and does not clearly encompass privacy and security issues, there is enough
of a foundation in the law for courts to at least explore the issue as law develops.
2. Disturbance
Disturbance involves unwanted intrusions that disturb tranquility, interrupt
activities, sap time, and otherwise serve as a nuisance. Many courts have held
that unsolicited telephone calls and text messages in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) constitute injuries in fact sufficient for
standing. As one court explained, the harm can involve “wasting the consumer’s
time” and “interruption and distraction.”230 In Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness
Group, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[u]nsolicited telemarketing
phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the
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solitude of their recipients.”231 Other TCPA cases are similar.232 As the Fourth
Circuit explained in Krakauer v. Dish Network, LLC,233 the harm the TCPA
addresses is receiving calls that people “previously took steps to avoid.”
Rejecting the notion that this harm was too intangible to be cognizable, the court
stated: “There is nothing ethereal or abstract about it.”234
Some courts, however, have rejected harm for certain types of communications
under the TCPA, such as text messages. In Salcedo v. Hanna,235 the Eleventh
Circuit found that the receipt of a single text message does not constitute a
concrete harm because a text message is different from a phone call or fax
because a text message was nothing more than a momentary annoyance.236 In
contrast, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs.,237 the Seventh Circuit concluded that
unwanted text messages cause harm because the “undesired buzzing of a cell
phone from a text message, like the unwanted ringing of a phone from a call, is
an intrusion into peace and quiet in a realm that is private and personal, [which]
is the very harm that Congress addressed [in TCPA].”238
Some courts have been skeptical of harm for the receipt of spam. In Cherny v.
Emigrant Bank, the defendant bank improperly shared its customer email
addresses with third parties, in violation of its privacy policy.239 As a result, the
plaintiff received spam. The plaintiff sued the bank based on breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of contract. The court held that “[t]he receipt of spam by itself,
however, does not constitute a sufficient injury entitling Cherny to compensable
relief.”240
E. AUTONOMY HARMS
Autonomy harms involve restricting, undermining, inhibiting, or unduly
influencing people’s choices. People are prevented from making choices that
advance their preferences. People are either directly denied the freedom to
decide or are tricked into thinking that they are freely making choices when they
Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Unsolicited
telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the
solitude of their recipients.”).
232
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Congress sought to prevent in enacting the TCPA); Melito v. Experian Marketing Solutions,
Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that unsolicited text messages, like unwanted calls
or faxes, constitutes the kind of nuisance and privacy harm that Congress identified when
enacting the TCPA);
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are not.
There are many types of autonomy harms: (1) coercion – the impairment on
people’s freedom to act or choose; (2) manipulation – the undue influence over
people’s behavior or decision-making; (3) failure to inform – the failure to
provide people with sufficient information to make decisions; (4) thwarted
expectations – doing activities that undermine people’s choices; (5) lack of
control – the inability to make meaningful choices about one’s data or prevent
the potential future misuse of it; (6) chilling effects – inhibiting people from
engaging in lawful activities.
1. Coercion
Coercion involves a constraint or undue pressure on one’s freedom to act or
choose. For example, HIPAA prohibits conditioning medical treatment on
agreeing to provide data for marketing or other uses.241 The California
Consumer Privacy Act restricts penalizing people who exercise their privacy
rights with higher prices.242
We could not find many cases involving coercion, but we surmise that coercion
would readily be recognized as causing harm. Coercion is visceral. It has all of
the classical attributes that make it readily cognizable. Many problematic
privacy practices, however, are manipulative rather than coercive, and
manipulation exists more in the hazy zone for recognizing harm.
2. Manipulation
Manipulation involves undue influence over a person’s behavior or decisionmaking. Manipulation is one of the most prevalent forms of autonomy harm in
the consumer privacy context. There is a spectrum of ways to influence decisions
and behavior. Distinguishing between acceptable influencing (persuasion and
nudging) and unacceptable influencing (manipulation) is challenging and
contestable.
Ido Kilovaty contends that manipulation “impairs the ability of individuals to
make independent and informed opinions and decisions. . . . It effectively
deprives individuals of their agency by distorting and perverting the way in
which individuals typically make decisions.”243 According Daniel Susser, Beate
Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum, manipulation “is a kind of influence--an
attempt to change the way someone would behave absent the manipulator's
interventions.”244 They distinguish manipulation from persuasion and coercion:
241
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“Persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up to them, while
coercing someone robs them of choice.”245 A coerced person understands that
they are coerced where as a manipulated person might not realize that they are
being turned into a puppet: “Coercion is blunt and forthright: one almost always
knows one is being coerced. Manipulation is subtle and sneaky. Rather than
simply depriving a person of options as the coercer does, the manipulator
infiltrates their decision-making process, disposing it to the manipulator's ends,
which may or may not match their own.”246 According to Cass Sunstein,
manipulation involves “an effort to influence people’s choices counts as
manipulative to the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their
capacity for reflection and deliberation.”247
In a survey of various definitions of manipulation, Shaun Spencer observes that
they all share some common elements: “they all contain the notion of
circumventing the subject’s rational decision-making process” and most require
intent to manipulate.248 Drawing from these definitions, Spencer defines
manipulation as “an intentional attempt to influence a subject’s behavior by
exploiting a bias or vulnerability.”249
Ryan Calo contends that manipulation “creates subjective privacy harms insofar
as the consumer has a vague sense that information is being collected and used
to her disadvantage, but never truly knows how or when.” Manipulation “also
creates objective privacy harm when a firm uses personal information to extract
as much rent as possible from the consumer.”250 According to Sunstein, the harm
of manipulation “is that it can violate people’s autonomy (by making them
instruments of another’s will) and offend their dignity (by failing to treat them
with respect).”251 Tal Zarsky contends that manipulation is harmful because
“[m]anipulative practices impair the process of choosing, subjecting it to the
preferences and influences of a third party, as opposed to those of the individuals
themselves.”252
Manipulation can affect not just individuals but also create societal harm, as
people’s decisions can affect not just themselves but society as well. The
Cambridge Analytica incident involved the use of personal data on a mass scale
to influence people’s decisions in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and in the
United Kingdom’s vote for Brexit.253
245
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The FTC has recognized that trade practices that prevent consumers from
“effectively making their own decisions” are ones that cause substantial injury.
“Most of the Commission's unfairness matters are brought under these
circumstances. They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular
consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that
unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of
consumer decisionmaking.”254
When it comes to private litigation, manipulation has not been the subject of
many privacy cases. As Cass Sunstein notes, “Because of the pervasiveness of
manipulation, and because it often does little or no harm, the legal system
usually does not attempt to prevent it.”255 Spencer is also skeptical about the
law’s ability to regulate manipulation because “it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to establish that the allegedly manipulative stimulus caused the
consumer harm.”256 People respond very differently to manipulation, and people
might not even realize that they are being manipulated.
3. Failure to Inform
Failure to inform involves failing to provide individuals with information to
assist them in making informed choices about their personal data or exercise of
their privacy rights. Failure to inform involves autonomy because it limits
people’s ability to make choices consistent with their preferences.
Courts are inconsistent in recognizing harm for failing to inform. In Robertson
v. Allied Solutions, for example, the plaintiff Robertson applied for a job at
Allied. Allied obtained a background check on Robertson. Although the FCRA
requires that applicants be provided a copy of the report and information about
their FCRA rights, Allied failed to provide either to Robertson. The Seventh
Circuit held that she was harmed because she “was denied information that could
have helped her craft a response to Allied's concerns.”257 Even if the information
in the report is true, the court noted, a consumer might want to “bring additional
facts to the employer's attention that put matters in a better light for the
consumer.258
In Long v. SEPTA, an employer rejected applicants based on background checks
that turned up information about convictions involving illegal drugs. Although
FCRA requires that the applicants be provided a copy of their background check
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report and a written statement of their FCRA rights, SEPTA failed to provide
these things.259 The court concluded that the failure to provide a copy of the
reports harmed plaintiffs by denying them the right to “see or respond” to
them.260 But regarding the failure to inform the applicants about their FCRA
rights, the court concluded that they lacked standing because the plaintiffs knew
their FCRA rights “to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period,
so they were not injured.”261
When individuals are not informed of their rights or not given important
information, they are harmed because they lose their ability to assert their rights
at the appropriate times, to respond effectively to issues involving their personal
data, or to make meaningful decisions regarding the use of their data. Laws that
mandate that people be informed of their rights are designed to empower
individuals and arm them with appropriate knowledge. The holding in Long
creates a closed circle where plaintiffs will never be able to enforce FCRA’s
rights disclosure requirement. If the plaintiffs do not know about their rights,
then they likely will not know they can bring a lawsuit. If they bring a lawsuit,
then courts will throw it out because they knew enough about their rights to sue.
This closed circle all but forecloses enforcement of this provision.
In cases where people are not informed that their personal data was used to make
a decision about them, they are harmed because informing them is to allow them
to understand how their data affected a decision and to give them an opportunity
to respond. This response might not be a direct refutation of the data. The
response could take many forms, from providing additional data to explaining a
situation to raising other unrelated considerations that might outweigh the
negative impact of the data. Even if the response might fail to change minds,
people should still have a chance to make their case. By way of analogy, denial
of people’s day in court is harmful even if they would likely have lost their case.
The harm is in their losing their right to be heard.
4. Thwarted Expectations
The harm caused by thwarted expectations involves the undermining of people’s
choices, such as breaking promises made about the collection, use, and
disclosure of personal data. Thwarted expectations is an autonomy harm
because it results in people’s inability to make choices in accordance with their
preferences.
Courts are generally dismissive of thwarted expectations as a cognizable harm
unless it is accompanied by other harms, such as reputational, economic, or
emotional harm. As Margot Kaminski aptly observes, “in the information
privacy context, the Supreme Court and others have repeatedly asked for privacy
259
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plaintiffs to show something more.”262
When data is used improperly without people’s consent, courts tend to look for
economic harm rather than recognize that improper use of personal data can be
harmful to autonomy. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation263 plaintiffs
sued Google for using their personal data in different ways than had been
promised, but the court found that they lacked standing because they failed to
allege how Google’s “use of the information deprived them of the information’s
economic value.”264 In Fraley v. Facebook, the court also focused on economic
value when it concluded that plaintiffs suffered harm when Facebook used their
“likes” to promote products without their permission. 265 The court held that
“personalized endorsement” to friends “has concrete, provable value in the
economy at large.”266
Generally, courts have not found harm when companies share personal data with
third parties in violation of their privacy policies. In Smith v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, for example, the court concluded that plaintiffs suffered no harm when a
bank that sold their personal data to third parties in violation of its privacy
policy: “[C]lass members were merely offered products and services which they
were free to decline. This does not qualify as actual harm.”267
Plaintiffs have fared better when statutes are the source of the expectation that
data will not be shared. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, the
court concluded that a Viacom’s improper collection of personal data about the
videos people watched on its website and its disclosure of the data to Google
was a cognizable harm. The court noted that “when it comes to laws that protect
privacy, a focus on economic loss is misplaced” and that “the unlawful
disclosure of legally protected information” was “a clear de facto injury.”268 In
Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that sharing personal
data with a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA)
was a harm because “both the common law and the literal understanding of
privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her
person.”269
In contract law, courts are adamant about focusing on economic harm. In In Re
Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litigation, Google tracked users’
Internet activity in violation of its promise to respect users’ “do not track”
settings. The court held that the plaintiffs could not prove harm because they
262
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could not demonstrate that Google interfered with their ability to monetize their
personal data.270 In a series of cases involving airlines that shared passenger data
with the government in violation of their privacy policies, courts held that the
plaintiffs failed to show harm.271 For example, in In re Jet Blue Airways Corp.
Privacy Litigation, the court held that recovery in contract “allows only for
economic losses.”272
Many courts fixate on whether plaintiffs have read and relied on the privacy
policy of a company, but the privacy policy plays a small role in forming
people’s privacy expectations.273 This is especially true because hardly anyone
reads privacy policies, and it is not rational to do so given the vast number of
organizations collecting data about people.274 Instead of focusing on the
promises in privacy policies in isolation, courts should consider more broadly
people’s reasonable expectations regarding privacy. Website or browser privacy
settings, company advertising, statements, and other design elements have an
influence on people’s expectations.275 Courts, however, will not go this far, and
cases to date have focused mainly on violations of explicit promises in privacy
policies or statutory requirements.
However, there is a basis in contract law to recognize thwarted expectations as
a harm. When a party to a contract fails to perform a term in a contract, even if
it is a matter of mere personal taste that lacks value, courts will still enforce the
term. In construction contract cases, for example, the difference in the value of
property with and without the plaintiff’s preferences might be slight or nil.
Instead of assessing damages based on the difference in actual value, courts
assess damages for the “cost of completion” because the “fair market value of a
home does not necessarily reflect the value to the homeowner.”276 As Judge
Cardozo famously stated in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, in a construction
contract, “[t]here is no general license to install whatever, in the builder’s
judgment, may be regarded as ‘just as good.’”277 These cases suggest that the
failure to respect people’s preferences is a cognizable harm even these
preferences do not add any economic value. For many people, their privacy
270
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preferences are an important consideration about whether or not to use a
particular service or product.
In contrast to contract law, the FTC readily enforces for violations of privacy
policies. Under the FTC’s enforcement of the prohibition on “deceptive” acts or
practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has viewed broken promises
in privacy notices to be sufficient for harm.278 Deception need not just involve
statements made in privacy notices, as the FTC has found other statements about
privacy to be deceptive.279 The very crux of deception as used in the context of
broken promises is that the harm is in personal data being used in ways that
differ from how companies informed people it would be used. One of us has
argued that the FTC could and should extend its jurisprudence further to pursue
cases where people’s expectations were thwarted even if no false statements are
made.280
Critics claim that the FTC should curtail the extent to which it recognizes harm
for thwarted expectations. James Cooper and Joshua Wright contend that the
FTC has become undisciplined about how it recognizes privacy harms.281 They
argue that “unexpected data practices do not always equate to privacy harm.”282
They use an example of a smart oven app that records oven usage data, which is
improperly shared with third parties. They argue that the FTC should not
recognize harm in this case because the app’s thwarting of privacy expectations
“may be mediated through the market or the legal system.”283 They argue that
“a focus on expectations, rather than harm, necessarily will be overly
inclusive.”284
The market, however, is not adequate to address the problems with the app.
When people use an app that thwarts their privacy expectations, people’s ability
to assess the risks of using the app is impeded. The market cannot work fairly if
people’s expectations are completely wrong, if people lack knowledge of
potential future uses of their personal data, and if people have no way to balance
the benefits and risks of using products or services.
5. Lack of Control
Lack of control involves the inability to make certain choices about one’s
personal data or to be able to curtail certain uses of the data. Many statutes
278
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provide certain rights or restrictions regarding the retention and use of personal
data independently from what is promised in an organization’s privacy policy.
The harm for violations of these rights or restrictions is not thwarted
expectations, as people might not have known about these statutes. Instead, the
harm involves the loss of control over personal data.
Courts have been inconsistent in recognizing the loss of control as a harm. In
Braitberg v. Charter Communications, for example, the Eighth Circuit denied
standing to plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against a cable company for failing
to delete their personal data in violation of the Cable Communications Policy
Act. The court concluded that the mere improper retention of data was not
sufficient, by itself, to create a “material risk of harm.”285 In Gubala v. Time
Warner Cable, Inc., the court denied standing to a cable subscriber suing a cable
company for improperly retaining personal data under the Cable Act because
there was no harm for merely holding data.286 Similarly, in Rivera v Google, the
court denied standing to plaintiffs who sued Google for storing their biometric
data without their consent, a violation of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA). The court concluded that there was no harm because the
data was not shared with anyone.287 There are other courts that recognize the
loss of control as a harm sufficient to justify standing.288
Losing control over our personal data constitutes an injury to our peace of mind
and our ability to manage risk. In the clutches of organizations, personal data
can be used for a wide array of purposes for an indefinite period of time. Privacy
laws seek to regulate data flows to protect individuals from potential
downstream uses. The practicalities of litigation, which are constrained by
statutes of limitation, require an assessment of the situation before the end of the
data life cycle.
Warren and Brandeis based their argument upon an English case from 1848 –
Prince Albert v. Strange. This case involved a suit at equity to prevent William
Strange from publishing a catalog describing etchings that the royal couple made
about their family.289 The court enjoined the publication of the catalog. Warren
and Brandeis argued that the case involved the protection of “inviolate
personality.”290 The case did not involve lurid images or embarrassing secrets
(they were endearing hand drawn images of a mother with her child), and the
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couple had shared these personal etchings with loved ones.291 Thus, the harm,
as imagined by Warren and Brandeis, was the undermining of control over the
extent to which personal information is circulated. This type of harm should be
enough.
6. Chilling Effects
Chilling effects involve harm caused by inhibiting people from engaging in
certain civil liberties such as free speech, political participation, religious
activity, free association, freedom of belief, and freedom to explore ideas.292 As
Frederick Schauer observes: “The very essence of a chilling effect is an act of
deterrence.”293 According to Neil Richards, the failure to protect privacy can
chill individuals from engaging in reading or researching.294 In cases involving
rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, courts have
sometimes recognized harm when people are chilled from exercising rights, such
as free speech or free association.295
Chilling effects have an impact on individual speakers and society at large as
they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the nature of expression that
is shared.296 Monitoring of communications can make people less likely to
engage in certain conversations, express certain views, or share personal
information. Consider the impact of news that the gay dating app Grindr had
shared subscribers’ HIV status with analytics firms. Subscribers expressed
profound dismay. Individuals told the press that they would no longer share that
information on that app or any dating app—it was simply not worth the
possibility that employers or others could find out their HIV status and hold it
against them.297
Courts have been uneasy about recognizing chilling effects, and the law has
wavered. In Laird v. Tatum, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the chilling effect
doctrine by concluding that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm.”298 Courts have subsequently struggled to determine the
line between an objective and subjective chill.299
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Despite the somewhat murky status of the law, the concept of chilling is widely
accepted even if its precise contours remain unclear. Although the chilling effect
doctrine emerges from cases involving the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the concept could certainly be applied to other legal contexts.300
F. DISCRIMINATION HARMS
Discrimination harms involve entrenching inequality and disadvantaging people
based on gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation, age, group
membership, or other characteristics or affiliations. Discrimination harms thwart
people’s ability to have an equal chance to obtain and keep jobs, secure
affordable insurance, find housing, and to pursue other crucial life opportunities.
Because discrimination harms disproportionately affect marginalized
communities, they have systemic effects on these communities and broader
negative societal effects.
Discrimination often involves curtailment of autonomy, but it differs from
autonomy harms in that discrimination involves unequal treatment that creates
shame and stigma as well as societal consequences of further entrenching
disadvantages to marginalized groups. Discrimination creates harm far beyond
lost opportunities; it leaves a searing wound of stigma, shame, and loss of esteem
that can turn into permanent scars.
The misuse of personal data can be particularly costly to women, sexual
minorities, and nonwhites given the prevalence of destructive stereotypes and
the disproportionate surveillance of women and marginalized communities in
their intimate lives.301 For example, employers and health insurance companies
can access information that women share with period-tracking apps (including
their moodiness and cramps), which could result in raised premiums and denied
promotions.302 Women and minorities are often disproportionately targeted for
vicious online harassment, which often involves doxing – the sharing of their
personal data such as home address and location – in order to expose them to
physical danger.303 Harassers post victims’ nude photos and embarrassing
information about their sex lives or sexual health, causing them substantial
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emotional and reputational harm.304 Although these types of harm are separate
categories in our typology, there is a distinct and additional dimension that they
add: the entrenchment of existing patterns of inequality.
In cases involving cyber mobs that inundate victims with crude, threatening, and
abusive comments, plaintiffs have sought to protect themselves by bringing
privacy tort cases.305 But litigation is complicated by the fact that the harm is
often caused by the totality of the comments, making it hard to allocate the harm
among the multitude of commenters.306 The members of the mob are often
anonymous, and it is difficult and expensive to identify them.307 Even when the
perpetrators are tracked down, suing them is often impractical because they often
are unable to pay enough monetary damages to incentivize lawyers to litigate.308
To combat cyber mobs effectively, victims turn to social media platforms to shut
down the mob, but Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes
these platforms from liability for user-generated content.309
Beyond doxing and threats targeted at people in marginalized groups, there are
less overt forms of discrimination harms. These harms are difficult to redress
because they often occur in the shadows. The decision-making process of
employers, insurance companies, landlords, and other powerful actors is opaque.
If an employer used a third-party hiring service to score candidates, then rejected
applicants will have no way to know that the hiring service relied upon their
intimate information (like their painful periods or infertility).310
A key aspect of discrimination harms is the unequal frequency, extensiveness,
and impact of privacy violations on marginalized people. People of color are
disproportionately targeted by surveillance.311 Algorithms that appear neutral
often have disproportionate effects on minorities.312 Poor people are often
subjected to oppressive surveillance as part of public assistance bureaucracy.
Black mothers are “stripped of formal privacy rights claims by signing an
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encompassing waiver” when applying for assistance.313 As Khiara Bridges
contends, “poor mothers are not given privacy rights because society, and thus
the law, presumes that their enjoyment of privacy will realize no value or
negative value.”314 Mary Anne Franks notes that surveillance often does not
affect marginalized and non-marginalized people equally: “For the less
privileged members of society, surveillance does not simply mean inhibited
Internet searches or decreased willingness to make online purchases; it can mean
an entire existence under scrutiny, with every personal choice carrying a risk of
bodily harm.”315
Privacy torts and other tort claims lack the language and concepts to address
discrimination harms.316 The disparate effects of certain privacy violations are
not considered as part of the harm equation. In contrast, federal statutes do
recognize privacy violations as producing discrimination harm, such as the
federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). GINA prohibits employers from requesting,
requiring, or obtaining employees’ genetic information. The ADA limits the
ability of employers to make medical examinations or inquiries of job applicants
under a number of circumstances.317
The civil rights legal tradition has the capacity and vocabulary to address
discrimination harm—the denial of social and economic opportunities due to
one’s membership in a protected group.318 Federal and state civil rights laws
secure the ability to work, attend school, use the telephone, secure housing, and
vote on equal terms.319 But these laws still have not been applied sufficiently to
privacy violations. One of us has proposed situating and treating privacy as a civil
right so discrimination harms caused by privacy violations can be addressed.320
Existing civil rights laws admittedly do not cover all social goods in need of
protection321 or to all parties given the state action doctrine. 322 They mostly do
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not constrain corporate handling of personal data.323 Nonetheless, situating
private sector surveillance of intimate life as a matter of civil rights helps begin
the conversation about what those freedoms should be in the context of privacy
law specifically and civil rights law more generally.
G. RELATIONSHIP HARMS
Relationship harms involve causing damage to important relationships that are
important for one’s health, well-being, life activities, and functioning in society.
Privacy violations can harm personal and professional relationships as well as
relationships with organizations. People modulate personal relationships by
maintaining boundaries around their information or by withholding information
from some people and not others.324 Strangers develop close relationships by
entrusting each other with deeply personal information. Consider
communications among people using fertility tracking apps. On apps like Clue,
subscribers gather online to explore struggles with miscarriages, abortions, and
infertility. They often form bonds with each other. Their relationships depend
upon trusting each other to maintain the confidentiality of their information.
Relationship harms are two-fold: most immediately, the loss of confidentiality
and in the longer term, damage to the trust that is essential for the relationship
to continue.325 As Nancy Levit remarks, the “development of protection for
relational interests evidences a communitarian view of the role of tort law. . . .
The vision being promoted is one of the responsible social interaction: a
commitment to the value of the permanency of relationships and to appropriate
treatment within those relationships.”326
The law has recognized relationship harms, though it has done so inconsistently.
Evidentiary privileges restrict the disclosure of communications between
attorney and client, priest and penitent, husband and wife, and psychotherapist
and patient.327 The point of protecting certain relationships is to foster candid
expression and the preservation of the relationships.
The breach of confidentiality tort extends to certain relationships—mostly
323
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professional ones—but it fails to protect many other relationships, such as
personal and familial ones.328 Courts have refused to treat companies as having
a duty to keep personal data confidential even though they are in a position of
trust and exercise power over individuals’ personal data.329
The law of fiduciary relationships also safeguards against relationship harms. A
fiduciary relationship has long been part of the law of trusts and has been
recognized as a special relationship.330 Because the trustee is in a “position of
special trust, the trustee owes certain special duties to the beneficiary.”331 As one
of us has noted, a wide array of relationships have been deemed to be fiduciary
ones, and the law is open-ended about recognizing such relationships.332
According to Jack Balkin, “Because of their special power over others and their
special relationships to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act
in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose information they
collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute.”333 Fiduciaries owe special duties
including confidentiality, loyalty, transparency, care, and others.334
The relationships recognized as fiduciary ones is open-ended rather than a fixed
list. In breach of confidentiality cases, courts have recognized fiduciary
relationships between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, bank and customer,
as well as school and student.335 One of us argued that the concept of fiduciary
relationships can be expanded to regulate consumer privacy because “companies
collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship
with us.”336
Recently, a number of scholars have further developed this argument, most
notably Jack Balkin, Woodrow Hartzog, Neil Richards, and Lauren Scholz. As
Lauren Scholz observes, “[f]iduciary law’s core goal of preventing opportunistic
behavior.”337 She contends that “[i]mplying a fiduciary relationship has the
advantage of enabling courts and the justice system to allow and enforce
expectations as they are situated in concrete relationships.”338 Thus far, however,
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the application of the law of fiduciary relationships to privacy has developed
slowly, mainly in breach of confidentiality cases in a limited set of professional
relationships, but it certainly has potential to develop further in the future.
* * *
As we have pointed out above, the law is lacking in coherence and consistency
regarding the recognition of cognizable privacy harms. Courts are often failing
to recognize privacy harms and are thwarting the enforcement of privacy
violations or leaving them unremedied. Our typology of privacy harms aims to
help explain why each type is harmful. We also have endeavored to show that
there are concepts in other legal contexts that could be applied to recognize
certain types of privacy harms.

VI. CONCLUSION
A well-calibrated legal response to privacy cases would permit socially
beneficial personal data practices while requiring robust protections for the
handling of personal data. Its primary focus should be on the deterrence of
violations with the goal of encouraging widespread compliance. Compensation
is important for individuals who have suffered significant harm.
Legal intervention should be designed to ensure that socially beneficial
information practices continue. Our economy depends upon the collection and
sharing of personal data. At the same time, personal data practices are inherently
risky. Privacy law aims to ensure that personal data is used properly, that
individuals have the ability to make decisions about their personal data, that
there are meaningful guardrails and boundaries about how data is collected,
used, or disclosed.
But struggles with recognizing cognizable privacy harms have impeded the
law’s effectiveness. Failing to recognize harm caused by certain activities can
result in the failure to legislate to protect against them or to regulatory strategies
that do not adequately enforce against them.
The most deleterious impact of failing to recognize harm has occurred in
litigation. Crabbed conceptions of harm have led courts to dismiss cases that are
a key lynchpin for privacy law enforcement. The common law as well as
litigation of private rights of action have much to contribute to the development
of privacy regulation. The common law remains underdeveloped. Although
currently, the common law privacy has failed to develop adequate protections of
privacy in the digital age, the common law has doctrines, concepts, and remedies
that can be very effective tools for protecting privacy.
Private litigation can play a major role in effective privacy law enforcement, and
there are foundations in the law for it to develop in productive ways. For
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example, one of us has contended that strict liability has been underutilized in
privacy cases.339 Strict liability obviates proving fault, and the vast repositories
of personal data that are being maintained about people can be analogized to the
ultrahazardous activities of the Industrial Age. Lauren Scholz argues that
restitution is a viable remedy for many privacy violations.340 Restitution
involves returning back benefits that unjustly enriched a defendant. Scholz also
recommends that “[g]iven the cramped nature of the privacy torts, a better
avenue for tort law for data trafficking lies in torts related to wrongful business
practices. This family of torts has the aim of promoting basic fair play in
commerce.”341 Scholars have recommended developing the protections of
fiduciary relationships to apply to companies that process personal data,
including one of the authors of this article.342 Moreover, various federal statutes
lacking a private right of action can still serve as the basis for the standard of
care in common law tort actions, such as UDAP laws, negligence, breach of
confidentiality, and others.343
The requirement of harm has been a significant impediment to the law’s
development. The rigid clinging to an approach where enforcement goals and
remedies are misaligned results in cases that are inconsistent and incoherent.
With the proper alignment, a broader recognition of privacy harms, a better
understanding of privacy problems, and a more flexible approach, the law can
more effectively protect privacy in ways that are fair to all stakeholders.
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